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The American military planning system is examined to
determine what concepts, habits, skills, arts, instruments,
and institutions of the U.S. national culture are relevant to
the development of military plans and policy. A supporting
line of inquiry examines the juxtaposition of the history of
military planning with the American value system, and
explores the evolution of the American planning system
through the years. A review of recent styles of strategic
thought from over-reliance on quantitative methods to a more
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the American
military planning system to determine what concepts, habits,
skills, arts, instruments, and institutions of the U.S.
national culture are relevant to the development of military
plans and policy. What about the American character and
culture must a planner understand to produce viable and
acceptable long-range plans?^
A supporting component of this inquiry examines how the
American military planning system has evolved through the
years. How and why did the original design of the system
differ from existing European and classical systems; what
aspects of the American historical experience contributed to
the system's evolution, and how successful has the system
been?
Several major assumptions are crucial to this study. The
first is that U.S. military policy is an integral part of
U.S. foreign policy. In the American system of government
the various aspects of foreign policy are inter-twined so
The word" "American" as used here and throughout the
thesis refers to the people and culture of the United States,
the colonial culture on the North American continent which
later became part of the United States, and occasionally to
the government of the United States.

that it is difficult to separate economic policy from
diplomatic policy and diplomatic policy from military policy.
American traditions do not allow the independent pursuit of
goals by solely military means. Despite the fact that U.S.
military policy is well integrated into a greater foreign
policy, however, it is possible to view the primarily
military aspects of foreign policy as a definable subset.
2
A second major assumption is that foreign policy, and
therefore military policy, is based on a limited number of
specific principles or interests which form both the
foundation of the government and its best guarantee of
survival. 3 These basic interests are euphemistically
referred to as "national interests." A related assumption is
that each government determines its own national interests,
using its own system and methods, and since the character of
a government is determined by the values and character of the
^The degree to which military policy has been considered
part of foreign policy has fluctuated through the years. At
times it has been almost fully integrated; at times merely an
instrument. The degree of integration has depended on the
administration in power.
^In the American system planners ostensibly produce plans
designed to implement pre-determined policy. Some students
of technology and policy would postulate that the reverse is
often true in modern military planning; plans are based on
technological capabilities and policies are tailored to fit
the plans.

culture in which it is grounded, the best way to understand a
government's national interests is to develop an
understanding of the underlying culture.
The final assumption is that although a planning system
would ideally be designed to produce plans in the most
effective manner, most contemporary planning systems are more
the product of evolution than design. They may have
originated in a formal structure designed to meet the needs
of the time, but as the system and environment within which
they existed evolved so did they, and not always in parallel.
The American style of military planning is derived from a
unique historical experience. The creation of a new nation
as an experiment in liberal democracy, and the geographic
isolation, resource wealth, and adaptive nature of its
population, produced a way of doing things which required
significant modifications to the European mold into which it
had been poured.
From this unique base the American military planning
system evolved slowly for the first century and a half of its
existence. The nation's continued isolation from involvement
in world affairs promoted a complacency and lack of
perceived need for change. Only as a result of major armed




Since World War II, the stresses of rapidly changing
technology and world commitments have kept the military
planning system in constant, relatively rapid, evolution.
The most significant restructuring in the history of the
system occured with the National Security Act of 19^7 and the
development of NSC-68 in 1949, and after thirty-five years of
continual change both the structure and philosophy of the
American Military planning system are still in flux.
11

II. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE AMERICAN CHARACTER
A. IS THERE A U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST?
In 193^ American historian Charles Beard published a book
entitled The Idea of National Interest : An Analytical Study
in American Foreign Policy
,
which was designed to trace the
European origins and American development of the concept of
national interest. [Ref. 1] This book provided the best, or
at least the most comprehensive, study of U.S. national
interests since the publication of the Federalist Papers in
the late eighteenth century. Beard, however, was a
historian, and while he provided an excellent view of the
development of policies in support of U.S. national
interests, he did not provide a definition of exactly what a
national interest is and how it is determined.
Since Beard's time most attempts to deal with the concept
of national interest have been made by practical scholars
such as Hans Morganthau and George Kennan, who have dealt
with policy application rather than concept definition, and
by members of the scientific school of political science.
12

The latter have made efforts to "tame" this elusive
philosophical idea by quantifying it rather than by defining
it.
4
On the other hand, since the middle of the nineteenth
century there has been a strong U.S. tradition of popular use
of the undefined and often deliberately vague term "national
interest" either as a political cloak for the reinforcement
of traditional behavior, (as in the resurgence of strong
isolationism in the twenties and thirties) [Ref. 2], or as a
means of rendering palatable to the voting public actions
that might otherwise be unacceptable (as in the successful
efforts by sugar and general trade interests to promote the
annexation of the Hawaiian Islands as a strategic
necessity.) [Ref.3]^
Very few political thinkers have emerged in the last two
centuries of American life who have been brave enough (or
foolish enough) to deal with an attempt to actually define
^According to this school quantifying something is an
accepted, or even preferred, method of defining it.
^David B. Truman, in his book The Govern m enta l Process :
Political Interests and Public Opinion
,
(Knop f , 1951 \ p^i 50)
,
points out that the assumption that there is any interest of
the nation as' a whole is close to the popular dogmas of
democratic government based on the notion that if people are
free and have access to "the facts" they will all want the




the concept of "national interest" rather than merely
treating its application or quantification. Walter Lippmann
addressed a concept which he called "public interest",
referring to "...how, and by whom, the interest of an
invisible community over a long span of time is represented
in the practical work of governing a modern state.", and
defined as "...what men would choose if they saw clearly,
thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently."
[Ref .4]
Lippraann's "public interest" may come as close as
possible to defining "national interest", and to providing a
basis for determining the content of U.S. national interests.
His definition, however, is most useful by its philosophical
nature in illustrating the difficulties inherent in an
attempt to structure policy based on "national interest."
Three basic steps exist: (1) deciding upon an appropriate
philosophical definition of "national interests", (2)
developing a theory of the operation of that definition, and
(3) building and implementing a policy designed to apply that
theory.
No one had accomplished the first step until Lippmann in
1955, which may be the reason why historical attempts to
develop theories and policies based on U.S. national
interests have been so disjointed and confused — so £d hoc .
The United States has tended to develop its foreign policy
14

more on the basis of the opportunities of the moment than on
any sort of national consideration of probable long-term
consequences. U.S. foreign policy activity since 19^3 in
particular, but beginning even before that in the
expansionism of the late nineteenth century, has been a
process of acquiring new global interests a few at a time in
a sort of "layering effect", until now there seem to be U.S.
national interests in every corner of the globe.
B. EXPLORING THE AMERICAN CHARACTER
Beyond efforts to apply a definition to the phrase
"national interest" remains the fact that it is not a concept
the meaning of which can be derived by dictionary definition
alone. Rather, it must be viewed in the context of a
specific nation (state) before it acquires validity. The
uniqueness of the creation and development of the American
character and nation makes an exploration of these factors
"Louis J. Halle, in Dream and Reality; Aspects of American
Foreign Policy ( H a r p e r and Bro
t
hers
, 195 9) , a ttr i b u tes much
of the seemingly unorganized nature of U.S. foreign policy on
the world stage for a generation after 1898 to the fact that
American isolation from most world political affairs for
nearly a century had produced a body of officials and




especially important to an understanding of the determination
and, even more directly, the pursuit of U.S. national
interests . 7
French writer and thinker R. L. Bruckberger, in his
book Image of America
,
addresses the creation of the American
character and nation as follows:
"Strange and explosive were the fusion of the
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity with the
ferocity of human greed; of the humblest hopes for bed and
board with the most grandiose dreams; of the love of glory
with the taste for seclusion; of the vision of
goldfreighted rivers with the irresistable call of virgin
lands where one may enjoy the freedom of being an honest
man. Of this fusion American was made." [Ref.5]
A British student of American history, D. W. Brogan,
finds that, when compared to European development, "The
American historical experience has been totally different.
It has been the product of profound faith in man's
possibilities and of repeated historical justification of
that faith." [Ref.6]
Both these views plus the views of a number of other
thoughtful writers and scholars lend credence to the idea
that the American character is founded in a synthesis of a
'The French, Dutch, and Spanish colonial cultures in
North America and the African influence in slaveholding areas
were largely subsumed by the English influence, and formed a
basis for regional diversity rather than nation-wide impact.
The disenfranchisement and sub-humanization of the original
inhabitants of the continent also effectively eliminated any




belief in the perfectibility of man with the fortuitous
availability of a vast and rich geographical stage upon which
to play out that promise virtually unopposed.
8
The early colonists with the strongest influence on what
was to become the American character were the English
Puritans who settled the "Brave New World" of New England.
These heirs to both the strong English tradition of political
rights and the mystical traditions of European puritanism
found themselves in a virtually untouched, and, therefore
uncontaminated
, Utopia wherein they could exercise their
beliefs and prove the workability of their version of God's
plan for man on earth.
These beliefs contained themes only then becoming
acceptable to the formal governments of the European states,
themselves comparatively recent offspring of the strictly
structured feudal societies of the Middle Ages struggling
with the question of legitimacy of the state and the
philosophical basis for sovereignty. The Puritans had no
problem with the concept of legitimacy, for they saw the
state as simply one of the structural manifestations of God's
sovereignty through man on earth.
°The multiplicity of opinions and theories cited in
following pages merely expand on these two core




Because the state was part of God's structure, they
therefore saw no distinction between metaphysical and
political freedom. Since God created man free, with the
ability to reason and think, it would be both wrong and an
offense against God to deny man his freedom in any domain,
including the political. [Ref.7] This emphasis on reasoning
man as part of God's will and the consequent metaphysic of
promise for perfectibility led to a belief in and a respect
for the primacy of the person, which through the years
matured into a very American brand of aggressive
individualism.
9
The first Puritan settlers arrived with their
institutions and their philosophy already highly developed;
they simply implanted a pre-existing society in new soil.^0
This placement of a fully developed belief system led by the
^Max Lerner, in his Am erica as _a Civilization; Li f e _and
Thought in the United States Today (Simon and Schuster, 195TT
cites i his metaphysic of p rom ise as a crucial element in
American civilization.
''^Henry Steele Commager, in Th_e_ Am_er^c_an Mi_ndj_ An
Interpretation o f Am erican Thought and Character Since the
1 8 8 '
s
(Yale, 1950) notes that this importation of pre-
exist i ng institutions prevailed not only with the Puritans
but with the other European colonial settlers. According to
him one of the most significant aspects of the development of
the American character as a new entity was the fact that
while through the years these institutions suffered only
minor modifications, the modification of social structure was




second or third generation to a sense of "givenness"; an idea
that values were a gift from the past and that society was
pre-formed and set in place, and therefore ready for
operation without exploration or modification. [Ref.8]
This sense of "givenness" evolved over the years into a
belief in "absolutes"; the idea that there was a straight-
forward, pre-existing answer to every question. Any problem
could be addressed quickly and as a whole without intervening
complications or concern about extraneous factors. ^^ The
"givenness" of issues, however, did not mean that a potential
outcome could not be improved. The overwhelming success of
America's early colonists in conquering their environment and
making their society work reinforced a strong sense of
optimism. This optimism, when tied to their belief in
givenness, developed into a sense of destiny; a belief that
their endeavors succeeded because it was meant to be so, and
that any endeavor which they undertook could be justified in
and of itself.
This sense of destiny was exercised on a personal level
by the evolution of a sense of entreprenuership and a belief
1
1
''Impatience is an American Characteristic stems from
this lack of "acceptance of anything that is not easily
catagorized and quantified. Americans tend not to be
concerned with why things work, but only with how they work.
They have developed an antipathy to discussing the theory of




that personal achievement was the best measure of success in
a society where the traditional measures of status such as
class or birth were little used. On a community, and later a
national level, the senses of optimism and destiny grew into
a "crusader spirit" exemplified by an unsophisticated belief
in the ability to change things for the better by inserting
oneself into whatever situation was judged to be lacking by
American standards"^
Since there was an absence of an automatically accepted
earthly authority over society, combined with a strongly
individual approach to success, "majority rule" and populism
became substitutes for the missing societal "authority
figure." The basic premise of these systems was that as the
1 P Because of this American belief in the rightness of
American values and positions, sense of mission, and a belief
in the straight-forward nature of the world's problems,
Americans traditionally have seen nothing contradictory in
applying American solutions to non-American problems. They
have not consciously rejected the validity of other
solutions; they simply have not recognized the fact that
valid alternative solutions might exist. As a matter of
fact, they would not have been able to comprehend these other
solutions if they had recognized them because of the
overwhelming sense of the "rightness" of things American.
Henry Steele Commager in The American Mind says of the 19th
Century American "he did not so much ^disparage other peoples
and countries as ignore them." Louis J. Halle, in Dreams and
Reality: Aspects of Am erican Foreign Policy (Harper, 1959)
notes that while Americans may be characterized to some
extent by a "crusader spirit," the public finds it easy to
separate in its mind enthusiasm for a cause from sacrifice
for that cause. The relatively short timeframe of U.S.
adventures in pre-World War I imperialism, (to be discussed
later), is evidence of this trait.
20

beliefs of any one man had a value equal to those of any
other, the sum of the values of the largest number of men
must equal the highest societal value. "13
The American belief in absolutes applied to political as
well as philosophical values, so anything that was not
"right" (i.e. of the majority) must be "wrong." This concept
of the rightness of the majority became the substitute for
traditional legitimacy, and it led to a pervasive desire to
conform to the majority opinion and an intolerance and even




-^Ironically enough, it was the philosopher David Hume, an
inspiration and source of much of the reasoning of the
American nation's founding fathers, who pointed out what
would later prove to be (and is still proving to be) one of
the greatest weaknesses of the American democratic structure.
"The private interest of everyone is different; and though
the public interest in itself were always one and the same,
yet it becomes the source of as great dissensions by reason
of the different opinions of particular persons concerning
it." ("Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Part II, Section
VIII" in Theory of Pol it ics , edited by Frederick Watkins,
Nelson, 1951) Alexis de Tocqueville believed that the
carrying of this personal belief in majority rule into the
formal government structure would eventually doom the United
States because of what he saw as the incompatibility of the
democratic process with the effective conduct of foreign
relations. (Louis J. Halle, Dream and Reality
,
Harper, 1959)
^^There is . here an interesting paradox in that while
Americans are great "joiners" of organizations, evidently
finding great comfort in the community identity, they still
ostensibly espouse the creed of individualism and freedom of
conscious as being of highest value.
21

Belief in the collective nature of authority created a
situation in which statesmen and community leaders could not
depend simply upon the logic or rationality of a policy or
approach to gain the support necessary for its application.
Instead, they were required to find a way to convince the
largest number of people possible of the "rightness" of a
policy or approach in American terms, and so the process of
convincing became even more important than the issue itself.
This situation held true in New England from the earliest
settlement, but did not become prevalent in the Middle
Atlantic or southern areas until the broadening of the
franchise in the early 19th Century. Prior to that time,
leadership and policy-making powers in those areas were
vested in a respected elite of lawyers and businessmen whose
personal reputations were authority enough for the limited
number of politically aware voters.
An additional factor in the development of this system of
community values was the physical nature of the challenge the
colonists were called upon to meet. However well-developed
the political and religious systems of the settlers, they
were still faced with the task of creating a livable
environment from a wilderness. This task required a degree
of cooperation and interdependence which lent itself to the
development of trust of fellow community members and
22

friendliness and open concern for other accepted members of
the society.
As a consequence, Americans developed less of a sense of
personal privacy and more of a willingness to become involved
in the affairs of other members of the community. They
developed a tendency to open-handed generosity not only as a
preference but as a duty in support of the community. In
return, they expected both gratitude and an acceptance of
their right to expect reciprocity. [Ref. 91 They also
developed an intolerance of dissenters and of anyone who was
perceived as impeding the progress of the community.
Progress and growth held special values to Americans
because they were essential to the continued health of the
society. Community self-sufficiency was a necessity, and the
concentration of thoughts, emotions, and resources on one's
own community left little time or energy to worry about
external concerns. Every community needed to be "bigger and
better" in order to attract its share of human and economic
resources. Pictures were painted in shades of overstatement,
and the aforementioned American optimism and sense of
identity with the "rightness" of surroundings led to a strong
element of parochialism in the value system.
This parochialism and booster spirit contributed to
another American characteristic: the tendency to talk about
beliefs without defining them, based on the assumption that
23

other participants in the conversation held the same beliefs
and understand implicit meanings. [Ref.10] It is a
characteristic related to the earlier idea of the "givenness"
of the American value system and institutional legitimacy,
and is reflected in the fact that American political values
consist of much dogma and little supporting theory.
American historian Frederick Jackson Turner saw most of
the same characteristics in the American character as did the
proponents of the "Puritan influence" school, but he
attributed these characteristics not to any unique
political/religious values of the Puritans in a new land, but
rather to the influence of the frontier phenomenon on the
European colonists.
"Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and
modifications, lie the vital forces that call these origins
into life and shape them to meet changing conditions. ..All
people show development ...But in the case of the United
States we have adifferent phenomenon.. .This perennial
rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion
westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch
with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the
forces dominating the American char acter.. .The result is
that to the frontier the American intellect owes its
striking characteristics. That courseness and strength
combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical
inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that
masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic
but powerful to affect great ends; that restless nervous
energy; that dominant individualism, working for good and
for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which
comes with freedom— these are traits called out elsewhere
because of the existence of the frontier." [Ref.11]
Proponents of the Turner school believe that those
aspects unique to the American character developed primarily
24

after the early 18th Century with the indiscriminate
extension of the eastern seaboard's European colonial culture
into the great, and initially isolated, inland valleys where
new rules for survival applied. The accidental mixture of a
variety of European subcultures and the geographical and
psychological challenges of the frontier combined to create a
new and truly American man by cultural evolution rather than
by transformation of Puritan Englishmen and other Europeans
into Americans . ''5
Whatever the source (or sources) of the uniquely American
character, it was already well established by the visit to
the United States in 1831 of the perceptive Frenchman Alexis
de Tocqueville. He noted such characteristics as the
sovereignty of the people and its effect on the political
'^Louis J. Halle, in Drea m and Real i ty (Harper, 1959)
emphasizes the difference in self-identity between those
colonists living on the eastern seaboard and those in the
trans-Appalachian interior. Seaboard inhabitants were
educated as Europeans and felt close ties to that continent.
Inhabitants of trans-Appalachian lived in a world whose
horizons were limited to the immediate area. They were
schooled as woodsmen and subsistence farmers, and their
primary identity was with a specific community or region
rather than a broader European civilization. Vernon L.
Parrington, in M ain Currents in Am erican Thought
,
Vol. I
(Harcourt Brace, 195^41 noted that American ideals and
institutions emerged in large part from the silent revolution
which, during the mid-18th Century, differentiated the
American from the transplanted colonial. This change
resulted from an amalgam of the older English stock with
other races, and the subjection of this new product on a
great scale to the influence of diffused landholding.
25

system, the "tyranny of the majority," the strange habit of
people relying on "ready-made" opinions supplied by the
majority rather than indulging in independent thought,
American addiction to practical as opposed to theoretical
science, and the stability of general principles juxtaposed
with the flexibility and freedom of action available to
individuals. [Ref. 12] He also noted that the American
thinking process produced ideas that were all "either
extremely minute and clear or extremely general and vague."
[Ref. 13]
To the American of de Toe que v i 1 1 e ' s time and the
following century the moral superiority of America was
axiomatic. [Ref. 14] The cultural belief in the self-
justified and inner -directed nature of American society and
institutions contributed to a predominant feature of American
political life that might be identified as a "policy," but is
actually so pervasive as to be a cultural characteristic:
isolationism. Although the government policy of isolationism
stemmed from a combination of geography and the availability
of most resources necessary for independent development, the
American character, with its lack of need for extra-community
inputs and its unsophisticated optimism and belief in the
26

essential goodness of individual man, welcomed the ability to
remain removed from the "unnecessary" and negative European
power struggles . 16
At the conclusion of his book Im age of Am erica , R.L.
Bruckberger, another European, (although this time a
contemporary one), addressed a letter to Americans, in which
he stated:
"You have your country, you are always happiest when you
are at home and among compatr iots...Your country is vast
enough, rich enough, roomy enough to put you all at your
ease. You go on the principle that 'God helps those who
stay at home' and you sincerely believe that this is the
key to peace. At the same time you deploy your troops,
your planes, and your battleships all over the world, and
now and then you use them. You accept this as temporarily
unavo idable.. .Deep in your hearts you look back with
nostalgia at the day when America had no world
responsibilities. Since you are not imperialists, having
all you need at home, you long for the return of a day
which for you was so peaceful. But you may as well make up
your mind that that day will newer come again." [Ref. 15]
U.S. national interests, then, are articulated in the
context of a mainstream national character consisting of: (1)
a sense of the "givenness" of institutions and philosophy and
the simple and straight-forward nature of issues; (2) a self-
centered and inner-directed culture, with a parochial view of
the "Tightness" of things identified with oneself; (3) a
The luxury of isolation from power struggles and
significant external threats to national security permitted
the development of an anti-war tradition understandable in a
people whose normal unhampered pursuit of profits, careers,
and happiness made them shrink from anything that might cut






belief in the essential goodness of man (in particular the
individual), and a resulting optimism and refusal to accept
the validity of arbitrary limitations; and (4) a tendency to
do nothing by halves and to be unwilling to accept a passive
role when involvement becomes necessary. Max Lerner lists
certain traits which commentators tend to attribute to
Americans in all ages as: (1) a tendency to join in
(voluntary) associations, (2) a belief in democracy, (3) a
belief in equality and individual freedom, (4) "direct
action" in disregard of law, and (5) stress on local
government, practicality, prosperity, and material well-
being. [Ref. 16] He contends, however, that there is
actually no single pattern that can be called "the American
character," particularly in today's complex environment of
rapid change. ^'^
''The issue of regional and ethnic diversity in the U.S.
is of increasing importance, but the federal structure of
national government and the earlier-mentioned "tyranny of the
majority" drastically reduce the impact of regional or ethnic
minorities on the mainstream national culture as regards its
impact on the develop m"ent of national policy. This may be
changing with the increased awareness of the power of the
vote shown by some minorities in recent years. However, by
the time a minority group is able to organize a significant
power bloc to exercise its power in the mainstream culture,
it has usually lost most of its unique philosophical features




According to Montesquieu, the moral causes shaping
national character include religion, legal standards,
history, ideals, customs, and manners; the art of the wise
legislator is to frame laws that suit the spirit of the
people. [Ref. 17] Policy-makers must use these same
considerations in developing foreign policy, but the various
aspects of an "American national character" with which these
policy-makers deal is only one of the two inputs into the
determination of national interests, upon which foreign
policy and, hence, military planning is based. The other is
an element common to the national interests of all states;
that is, the preservation of the state itself by any (self-
defined) legitimate means to perpetuate the values of the
system. ^ °
C. THE GROWTH OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND FOREIGN POLICY
The American revolution was not a great philosophical
watershed, or even the heroic struggle of a down-trodden and
mistreated colonial society so often portrayed by
politicians in Independence Day speeches and in American
History texts published before the 1930's. It was, rather, a
conservative revolution in which the colonists, who already
1 ft
'"Arthur Schlesinger , Jr
.
, in "Foreign Policy and the
American Character," ( Foreign Affairs
,
Vol. 62, No.1, Fall
1983) says that the minimal motive for foreign policy is the





thought of themselves as Americans, fought to preserve an
existing system of self-rule from the imposition of British
controls, basing their arguments in part on a statement of
the rights of man as embodied in the philosophy of the French
Enlightenment. This statement, the Declaration of
Independence, was by nature technical, legalistic, and
conservative, replecting its creation by lawyers and by
businessmen-politicians. ^9 (Although the philosophy of the
preamble was derived from the Enlightenment, the remainder of
the document was English doctrine reformulated to address the
existing problem. [Ref. 13]^^
^The tendency to the creation of national policy by non-
statesmen, in essence amateurs, was born of necessity due to
the lack of a previous need for men skilled in national and
international affairs and fostered by the usual American
inclination to experiment and distrust of the "expert."
(Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind
,
Yale, 1950) This
birth in pragmatism has developed into a national disposition
to believe that government is a business rather than a
skilled profession, and businessmen and lawyers brought in
from the outside can adequately staff a foreign office.
(Louis J. Halle, Dream and Reality
,
Harper, 1959)
20 Gary Wills, in Explaining Am erica; The Federalist
(Penguin 1982), says that America's first entirely developed
art was political literature.
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Thus the revolution engendered no great philosophical
debate or intellectual crisis, but was a step forward in the
evolution of a maturing political (rather than philosophical)
system. Its relatively easy success reinforced both the
continuity of existing values and institutions and the
American tendency to empiricism and legalism rather than
metaphysical debate. 21 The continuity of institutional
experience was damaged in some areas by the departure, during
and after the revolution, of a number of loyalists, many of
whom were community leaders and prosperous members of the
business and land-holding classes. This was a blow, but not
a crippling one, and community recovery was rapid in most
cases
.
With this pragmatic beginning the representatives of the
various colonies committed the collective resources of their
constituents to the establishment of a new authority to
replace the improperly conducted government of George III,
his Parliament and Ministers. It is the very essence of what
later became the United States of America, however, that
2 1 Some scholars assign more importance to a seminal
"American" philosophy than is reflected here. Vernon L.
Parrington, in M ain Currents of Am erican Thought
,
Vol. I
(Harcourt Brace, 1954) finds great significance m the clash
between a liberal political philosophy and a reactionary
theology, and Henry Steele Commager in The Am erican M ind
(Yale, 1950) assigns primary importance to an Inheritance of




these men gathered not as representatives of any new nation
or representatives of the inhabitants of protesting colonies
of British North America as a whole, but as representatives
of thirteen separate entities, with the firm purpose of
representing primarily the interests of what were to be
sovereign states tied only secondarily (and sometimes
reluctantly) in a confederation designed to promote the
collective good. It took eleven years for the states to
recognize that a simple confederation would not function well
enough to accomplish the desired goals, and that a more
binding, federal structure was needed.
Even with the creation of a Constitution and a federated
republic, the idea of a "national" identity did not appeal to
many citizens, who continued to identify themselves primarily
with their own state. The word "national" does not appear in
the Constitution, largely because of fears of the drafters
that the image of a pre-emptive and coercive national
government would hamper ratification efforts. [Ref. 19] John
Jay and Alexander Hamilton used the device of the Federalist
Papers to promote discussion of the concept of the new United
States of America, to be formed by the Constitution as a
separately identifiable nation-state; an entity composed,
certainly, of diverse communities of interest, but empowered
and formed to represent the interests of the whole. George
Washington was also a Federalist, and his Farewell Address,
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at the end of his second term as President, strongly
emphasized the benefits of identification as a nation (or
country in his terminology) in which every component part
benefited from the union of the whole.
The sentimental appeal of a statement by the "father of
the country," who was greatly respected by most of his
contemporaries, as well as later generations of Americans,
may have drawn attention to the issue, but the first
articulation of U.S. national interests had already been
made—and to some extent integrated in policy— by Alexander
Hamilton. American historian Charles A. Beard found in
Hamilton's work the elements of what were to be
identified as U.S. national interests until the end of 19th
Century.
"...national interest, as formulated by Hamilton, the
principal author of measures and policy in Washington's
administration, had a positive and definite content; it
meant a consolidation of commercial, manufacturing,
financial, and agricultural interests at home, the
promotion of trade in all parts of the world by the engines
of diplomacy, the defense of that trade by a powerful navy,
the supremacy of the United States in the Western
Hemisphere, and the use of military and naval strength in
the rivalry of nations to secure economic advantages for
citizens of the United States." [Ref. 20]
Throughout American history, the disagreement among
political parties over national interests has been almost
exclusively over means rather than ends -- over practical
methods of securing objectives rather than over ultimate
values or even the priority of these values. [Ref. 21] The
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rise of agrarian interests under Jefferson and his
successors, and the serious divisiveness which eventually led
to the Civil War, did not involve questioning of the basic
values set forth in the Declaration of Independence or the
Constitution. Validity of the principles set forth by the
Founding Fathers was newer questioned, since proponents of
both manufacturing and agrarian interests and spokesmen of
both slave-holding and free states cited the same sources in
presenting apparently divergent views. ^2 (The drafters'
wisdom in providing a broad base for national development led
to the opportunity for, and practice of, interpreting these
documents to suit current needs, and the American tendency to
adapt existing theories rather than create new systems of
thought has made reference to these documents, in particular
P? One of the most familiar themes of American history is
the supposed early conflict between the "Ham il tonians"--
proponants of centralization and m er ch an t / ind us t r i a 1
interests -- and "Jeffersonians"-- proponants of de-
centralization and agrarian interests. There is convincing
evidence for the opposing theory presented by Richard
Hofstadt in The American Political Tradition and the Men Who
Made It (Knopf, 1 9^8) , who postulates that Jefferson was not
an anti-Federalist but merely an opportunist (like Hamilton)
who felt that the U.S. best future lay in the agrarian area,
and that Jackson, Jefferson's philosophical/political heir,
was basically an aspiring capitalist.
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The Constitution, an accepted call to authority based on the
assignment of some sort of mystical foresight to the
drafters. )23
Throughout the first century of the nation's existence,
the basic interests as formulated by Hamilton were pursued by
various means through the many vicissitudes of national
political development, continental territorial expansion and
civil war. With the exception of a few incidents with
Barbary pirates, and the implicit threat of the use of naval
force in the opening Asian markets, the United States
remained predominantly a continental power, with armed forces
designed for hemispheric defense and protection (plus
promotion in some cases) of trade interests. U.S.
participation in the War of 1812, naval activity in the
Mediterranean, and the Navy's opening of Japanese and Chinese
markets-- and keeping them open to free trade-- all had
economic roots and justifications.^
23 Gary Wills, in Explaining American : The Federalist
(Penguin, 1982) said of the actual" perceptibility oT the
Founding Fathers, "The Constitution they created has survived
not because of their predictions but in spite of them."
PU
'^Although with independence the idea of a cont inen tal
destiny became a principal ingredient in the development of
American nationalism, by the 1800's men of broader vision had
already begun to promote an attitude which, while perhaps not
evidence of a belief in broader destiny, was at least
indicative of an awareness of broader interests. Thomas Hart
Benton saw that "The trade of the Pacific Ocean, of the
western coast of North America, and of Eastern Asia, will all
take its track. ..The American road to India will also become
35

No thought was given to any moral obligation to interfere
in domestic or international quarrels to provide other
peoples with benefits of the American system of values and
politics, or to use economic or political power as a weapon
of disapproval against governments whose theories and
principles were unacceptable to the U.S. government. As late
as 1882, Secretary of State Frel ingh auysen denied any U.S.
national interest in "doing good" for its own sake in his
instructions to the American representative in Chile
concerning a possible war between that country and Peru.
"The President wishes in no manner to dictate or make
any authoritative utterance to either Peru or Chile as to
the merits of the controversy existing between these
republics. ..Were the United States to assume an attitude of
dictation toward the South American republics, even for the
purpose of preventing war, the greatest of evils, or even
to preserve the autonomy of nations, it must be prepared by
army and navy to enforce its mandate, and to this end tax
our people for the exclusive benefit of foreign nations."
[Ref. 22]
The first significant interference in the affairs of
another nation, on the premise of "moral obligation," occured
in 1894 when the United States stumbled into a quarrel over
Samoa, where Britain and Germany on one side and traditional
authorities on the other were perceived to be threatening the
24 (cont)the European track to that region. The European
merchant, as "well as the American, will fly across our
continent on a straight line to China." (Henry Nash Smith,
Virgin Lands: The American West as Symbol and Myth
,
Random
House, 1957, p. 28 5
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well-being of the native population. The U.S. became
involved when a naval officer, without instructions, seized
the naval base at Pago Pago with the idea of protecting U.S.
trade interests, but resident missionaries pleading the cause
of the natives brought about deeper involvement . ^5
The trend to acceptance of moral obligation as an
interest strengthened, however, as Americans became more
aware of their strength as a nation and less preoccupied with
internal affairs. During the Spanish-American War the
concept was a concomitant of commerce and national defense as
a valid national interest. 2° Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing in
Interest of America in Sea Power in 1898 espoused the theory
that in the spread of civilization the British Empire and the
American Empire had obligations to increase the "world sum of
happiness," stating:
"If a plea of the world's welfare seems suspiciously
like a cloak for national interest, let the latter be
accepted frankly as the adequate motive which it assuredly
is. Let us not shrink from pitting a broad self-interest
against the narrow self-interest to which some opponents of
imperialism would restrict us."
^-"Even m this instance President Cleveland, applying
hindsight, stated that "our situation in this matter was
inconsistant with the mission and traditions of our
government, in violation of the principles we profess, and in
all its phases' mischievous and vexatious." (Charles A. Beard,
The Idea of National Interest, Quadrangle Books, 1966, p.
Beard holds that moral obligation never came to be




President McKinley purportedly received a "message from
God," instructing him in his responsibility for saving the
Philippines from seizure by European powers or from anarchy,
and for civilizing. Christianizing, and uplifting them.
Senator Piatt received a similar message from the voters in
his state. For McKinley, the obligation applied only to
involvement in those situations where fate placed the destiny
of weaker nations in the strong, capable hands of the United
States. In later years, Theodore Roosevelt believed in the
responsibility for aggressive pursuit of honor, justice, and
righteousness wherever a need was perceived and by whatever
means was necessary, and he made such pursuit official
policy.
During the administration of William Howard Taft and the
era of "dollar diplomacy," the more traditional protection of
commerce theme gained re-acceptance as the primary (but not
exclusive) national interest, but with the election of
Woodrow Wilson in 1912 the moral obligation aspect of foreign
policy re-gained ascendency. (It re-gained ascendency as a
justification for policies, that is. In many cases it was
used to cloak the continuation of commercial interests.
President Wilson was absolutely sincere; Congress a little
less so
.)
The great culture shock of World War I, and the failure
of Wilson's grand ideas for world cooperation through a
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League of Nations, were causes for a rising sentiment for
American "withdrawal" from world affairs (in other than the
economic sphere) in the Twenties and Thirties. 27
Isolationists pointed out that the U.S. had nothing to gain
and much to lose by becomming involved in the endless power
struggles in Europe and world-wide implications of these
quarrels. The U.S. was powerful enough to prevent
intervention by other powers in its territories and interests
and should not be concerned about the rest of the world
except as an outlet for trade. (The rest of the world here
refers to areas other than the Western Hemisphere, Hawaii,
and the other Pacific territories and protectorates.)
Internationalists, on the other hand, felt that U.S.
interests were involved in European quarrels because of the
potential impact on the U.S. The disagreement was over
means, not ends; all but the most rabid isolationists
2'See Walter Lippmann's The Public Philosophy for an
thoughtful discussion of the immense impact on American
culture of World War I and the immediate post-war period.
America's transition to maturity as a member of the world
community of nations began in the watershed decade of the
1 890's.Commager cites several major cultural transitions
then in force : (1) from a primarily agricultural to
primarily urban and industrial economy; (2) from the
politics, economy, and morals of the 18th Century to a more
modern society with a changed population, institutions,
economy, and technology; (3) from self-containment to
involvement in "Old World" problems; and (4) from a
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recognized the necessity of maintaining trade relations with
the rest of the world, and rational internationalists
admitted that our worldwide interests were primarily
commercial
.
The U.S. failure to become involved in World War II for
two years after fighting had begun was evidence of the extent
to which "moral obligation" had fallen as a focus of national
interest. It took persuasion by the Japanese Empire to
convince the American people to become directly involved.
Until Pearl Harbor the war was seen by most Americans (and by
their less astute representatives) as simply another, more
intense European quarrel. Little public attention focused on
activity in Asia. Not until there was substantial, publicly
^'(cont)chauvanistic consciousness of unique
characteristics and destiny to an attempt to accomodate
traditional institutions and habits of thought to new and
alien conditions. (Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind
,
Yale, 1950) The two generations after the TB90's lived in a
time of transition from certainty to uncertainty, faith to
doubt, security to insecurity, and order to disorder. Louis
J. Halle holds that the modern history of American foreign
policy began in 1898. ( Dream and Reality, Harper and Brothers
1959) The U.S. engagement in overseas imperialism was so
abrupt and immediate and so little prepared that thinking
could not adjust itself. In their naivete Americans failed
to grasp the fact that most nations are not bound by pledges
and agreements as they are, and upon Wilson's inability to
reform the world after World War I there was a swing back to
popular sentiment for isolationism without an understanding
of why it was doomed to fail.
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recognized loss of American lives and property was the
country willing to war for a vital interest. °
After World War II the U.S. was forced into an unfamiliar
role as the only economically healthy major nation in a war-
devastated world. The mantle of world leadership devolved
upon it, and it again "felt a call" to a role as protector of
free governments and institutions.
Since 1945, the U.S. has managed. to juggle the three
traditionally accepted national interests abroad: Hamilton's
protection of commerce and promotion of national defense, and
the late 19th Century addition of the "moral obligation" of a
great power to see to the health of the world. These three
interests (or perhaps it is more accurate to say these three
aspects of the U.S. national interest) can obviously be
protected and promoted only by a government with credible
power and a credible willingness to use that power. Although
military forces are only one of the three aspects of a
government's power on the world scene, (the others being
economic power and political or moral persuasion), they are
almost always treated separately for planning and policy-
making purposes in the American system, because of its unique
2 R
°The phrase "publicly recognized" must be stressed.
American sailors and merchant seamen had been losing their
lives in the North Atlantic for some time, but for political
reasons this had been kept quiet.
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evolution. The history of the impact of the American culture
and perception of interests on military planning provide
clues to the modern American military planner in his search
for an effective and viable system.
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III. DEVELOPING THE MILITARY PLANNING SYSTEM - 1775-1945
A. AMERICAN MILITARY PHILOSOPHY
In 1981 Colin Gray completed a study of nuclear strategy
and national style, taking as his thesis the following.
"It is hypothesized here that there is a discernable
American strategic culture: that culture, referring to
modes of thought and action with respect to force derives
from perception of the national historical experience,
aspiration for self-characterization. ..and from all of the
many distinctively American experiences. ..that determine an
American national style is derivative from the idea of
American strategic culture, suggesting that there is a
distinctively American way in strategic matters ."[ Ref . 23]
Although Gray referred specifically to style in nuclear
strategy, the statement applies as well to the development of
a uniquely American military planning system. ^9 In a
democracy like the United States, where a military caste
never developed, the tendency to draw members from the
society at large, combined with the American tradition of
civilian control of the military, guaranteed the development
of a planning system reflecting the values of the society
much more than might be true in other states. The dramatic
29^ This is not surprising if one accepts earlier arguments
that a military planning system exists to support the
military aspect of foreign policy. Nuclear strategy is also
a sub-set of foreign policy, in some senses separate from and
in other senses over-lapping the subset of military policy.
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changes in the role of the military since World Warll may
dilute this argument, but it was obvious for the first 170
years of the nation's history.
There is a unique American style of military strategy.
Conventional wisdom assigns to it the following
characteristics: (1) with few exceptions Americans tended not
to think seriously about military strategy before World War
II; (2) from World War II through 1968 American military
strategy was characterized by dependence on an ideology or
fetish — anti-communism through I960, systems analysis from
1961 through 1968; (3) the general American public does not
have a developed sense of when the country is threatened, and
policy-makers themselves have divergent opinions on threat
issues; (4) Americans consider peace the normal pattern of
relations between states; (5) Americans are reluctant to
think in terms of military power during peacetime; (6)
Americans tend to turn war into a crusade; (7) since the
1930's the American execution and direction of war has placed
a disproportionate emphasis on technology; and (8) the
American approach to strategy tends to deal in terms of
shibboleths and absolutes. [Ref. 24]^^
^ Ken Booth, in his article "American Strategy: the Myths
Revisited" (in Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright, eds., American
Thinking About Peace and War
,
Barnes and Noble, 1978) argues
that this "conventional wisdom" is not valid. While most of
Mr. Booth's specific arguments are not particularly
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Each of these characteristics can be traced to a specific
aspect of the general American character postulated earlier.
When these values are applied to the development of military
doctrine, they create a system where the sole function of
military force in war is to achieve victory. There is no
place for political use of the military in war, and the
management of victory is a problem for the politician. The
American doctrine of war is rooted in the beliefs that: (1)
civilian supremacy excludes the military from partaking in
political judgements; (2) the physical self-containment of
the United States makes ambitions for territorial gain
inappropriate; and (3) the establishment of "spheres of
influence" and power politics for commercial and financial
advantage is wrong. [Ref. 25]-^
^^(cont)convincing, he does make the following valuable
points: (1) many of the characteristics labeled as peculiar
to Americans are actually common to a number of Western
societies, (2) we lack an American perspective and tend to
see things Eur oc-en t r ic a 1 1 y ; (3) many of the important
features of the "American way of war" are not explained by
reference to cultural characteristics but by a concatenation
of accidental factors; and (4) unquestioned acceptance of any
"comventional wisdom" is bad and even dangerous.
3lAmerican military activities in the Caribbean and the
Philippines in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were
justified as h'uraanitarian acts rather than power politics.




The leadership style of the American military man
operating within this strategic environment tends to be
managerial rather than strategic. He tends to believe that
there is always a simple, clear, unambiguous strategy for
every occasion, and to assume that a military planner can
discern this strategy. [Ref. 26] Throughout the history of
the American military planning system to World War II, these
beliefs caused no irreparable damage, and in the last four
decades they have evolved into a more sophisticated world
view. Until the middle of the 20th century, however,
American views on war and the resultant military planning
system were not much modified from their origins. ^2
B. ORIGINS AND EARLY GROWTH - 1775-1814
It is not surprising that the British Army stationed in
North America in 1775 were rather scornful of the "threat"
presented by the military forces of the rebellious colonies.
What is surprising is that the thirteen state militias and
the newly created Continental Army accomplished anything of
note against the seasoned British and mercenary troops.
op
-•It IS irrelevent to address a peacetime American
military planning system in the years before World War II.
The military 'was "not used for political purposes" and
therefore its only justification was in wartime. This factor




The Crown's unwillingness to bear the cost of stationing
regular troops in America until the 1750's had led to a
tradition of the "citizen soldier" who mobilized only in
response to a direct threat, and this in turn had created a
tradition of the diffusion of military power. When the
various colonies mobilized their militia in response to the
Continential Congress's call, they did so on an individual
basis, retaining control over the actions of their own troops
and maintaining the old system of short enlistments that had
always served well enough in the past. Although the pan-
colonial Continental Army was a more stable and professional
group, it was still an army of citizen soldiers led primarily
by statesmen officers.
The new American nation's first concept about war was the
importance of a "breakaway" from the European power system,
where war was presumed to be merely an episode of the greater
power struggle. [Ref. 27] In addition, most Americans
opposed large standing armies, seeing in them a threat to
liberty, democracy and popular government, economic
prosperity, and peace. 33 Elbridge Gerry articulated these
fears in June 178M when he stated "[SJtanding armies in time
-3 O
-'-'Most Americans of the time were heirs of or were
themselves members of groups who in Europe had suffered as a
result of the system of standing armies. They were the "have




of peace are inconsistant with the principles of republican
governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people
[and] generally converted into destructive engines for
establishing depotism." [Ref. 28] There was more generally a
fear of the uses to which politicians might put a standing
force than a fear of the force itself.
In response to these concerns, the Continental Congress
disbanded the Continental Army, (all but 700 men had been
released immediately upon cessation of hostilities),
retaining on active service only 25 privates to guard stores
at Ft. Pitt, 55 privates to guard West Point and other
magazines, and a proportional number of officers, none to be
above the rank of Captain. The responsibility for guarding
the frontier was given to the various state militias. Since
there was no immediate external threat, the nation would
depend upon its citizen soldiers and statesmen military
leaders when needed. The distances involved in any external
on
threat would theoretically give time for mobilization.-'^
OH
-'In 1783 General Washington had submitted a memorandum
entitled "Sentiments on Peace Establishment" to a committee
of Congress. In it he recommended: (1) a regular standing
force; (2) a well organized militia regularized across the
states; (3) establishment of a system of arsenals and stores;
and (4) academies for the instruction of the military arts.
There is no record that his comments were ever considered by
the Congress, which continued to deal with military planning
as it had in the past; by ignoring it. (Dale 0. Smith,






The framers of the Constitution envisioned a military
system based on the same presumptions as the existing system.
The liberal philosophy of the Founding Fathers did not
furnish a guide to considerations of war, peace and
international relations. Liberalism does not understand and
is hostile to military institutions and military functions,
and this liberalism dominated American political thinking
through the first half of the 20th century. [Ref. 29] No
separate military officer class was envisioned, as a
citizen's responsibilities included military service, and
civilian leaders would also be military leaders. 35 (Even the
Commander-in-Chief was to be a civilian.)
The possible need for a standing army in wartime was
addressed, but in the final draft of the Constitution there
is no reference to a regular army. 36 Congress is empowered
"to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a
navy." This difference in phraseology in reference to an
army and a navy is important. While a standing army was seen
^^This principle has been strictly adhered to through the
present. Americans like military heroes who are citizens
first and soldiers second.
•^^When Elbridge Gerry proposed a clause to the
Constitution to limit any standing army to 5000 men. General
Washington replied that he would pose no objection if the
clause were amended to prohibit an enemy from invading the
U.S. with more than 3000 men. (Dale 0. Smith, U.S. Military





as unnecessary and a potential domestic threat because of the
possibility of involvement in civil affairs, the necessity
for a standing navy to guarantee against invasion and
interference with commercial interests was reluctantly
conceded. Appropriations for land forces were allowed,
although they were limited to two years, in recognition of
the need for a frontier force. Even this measure was highly
controversial, and some delegates refused to sign the
document because of their opposition.
- The desirability of civilian control of the military was
never questioned. It had as its role the responsibility of
ensuring that military policies and agencies were
subordinated to other national traditions, values, customs,
policies, and institutions. In balance, it also ensured that
the military had access to resources, and conferred on it
political legitimacy. The question was not whether to
institute civilian control, but what form that control should
take. George Mason articulated one of the major concerns in
his statement "The purse and the sword ought never to get
into the same hands." [Ref.30] Consequently, the
Constitution was written so as to split these powers. The
President was given administrative and operational control,
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and Congress was given control over money and the sole power
to declare war . ^
'
Samuel Huntington documented three patterns of
organization available to a system of civilian control of the
military. In his "balanced" pattern, the President is
responsible for political policy and the general supervision
of the military establishment; below him a Secretary serves
as a basic policy-maker, and immediately below the Secretary
there is a split between military command and civilian
administration. (This pattern maximizes military
professionalism and civilian control.)
A "coordinate" pattern separates the military and
administrative functions immediately below the President.
(This pattern undermines civilian control, politicizes the
military, and encourages the President to intervene in
military planning and command where he has no expertise.) In
the "vertical" pattern authority goes from the President to a
Secretary to the military, with the administrative bureaus
under the military. (This pattern forces the military chief
^'Because of the legacy of fear of an overly strong
executive branch, prior to 1781 Congress had directly
supervised the military by committee; The Board of War and
Ordnance. There was little supervision exercised between
1781 and 1787, (Allan R. Millett, "The American Political
System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical
Perspective" Mershon Center Position Papers in the Policy






to sacrifiGe higher level for broader scope.) [Ref. 31] The
U. S. Const itutional system pushes the establishment in the
direction of a coordinated or vertical pattern. Civilian
control of the military has evolved more than most aspects of
the military system of the United States, but is is still
firmly entrenched as a "first principle
.
"^°
The first time the United States was required to decide
on the external use of its military forces involved the
question of whether to declare support for the French
revolution. Thomas Jefferson argued for involvement on an
ideological basis, but Alexander Hamilton and the leaders of
the then-dominant Federalist Party opted for non-involvement
based on the fragility of the new nation and the
inappropr iateness of involvement in European quarrels.
Despite an official policy of non-involvement there was a
great deal of sympathy for the French cause. This was the
first evidence of the conflict between idealism and realism
that was to be so characteristic of the Americans before the
second half of the 20th Century. 39
3°Huntington's Tjne S£l_d__ije£ _and _th_e_ State, (Harvard
University Press, 1957) contains an excellent exposition on
civilian control of the military in the United States; how it
has developed, and its strengths and weaknesses.
-^^Edmund Jones refers to an attitude of "vigilant
ambivalence"; a philosophical uncertainty coupled with
unwillingness to risk the consequences of making the wrong
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The decision to avoid involvement in European quarrels
was really the only possible course for the new nation, given
its increasingly obvious lack of any credible military force.
Even the state militias were ineffective for that purpose, so
in 1792 Congress passed the Militia Act, designed to
regularize practices across the states and improve the system
ef f ect i veness.^0 Unfortunately, this act lacked provisions
for financing and enforcement, and Congress found it
necessary to increase periodically (however reluctantly) the
number of Federal troops.
By 1794 the increasing activity of the Barbary pirates,
and an undeclared naval war with France, prompted Congress to
pass a Naval Act providing for the construction and manning
of six frigates. In 1798 it established the Navy Department
as a separate cabinet-level agency of the Executive Branch,
to be co-equal with the existing War Department. The
organization of each department consisted of a Secretary and
a few administrative personnel, and little provision was made
39 (cont)choice. ("Vigilant Ambivalence; American
Attitudes" in Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright American Thinking
About Peace and War
,
Barnes and Noble, 1978)
^Ojn 1787 Congress found it necessary to activate a
Federal force of 700 men on three year enlistments to
supplement state forces to protect the frontier. (Walter
Millis, Arms and Men, Rutgers University Press, 1957)
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for input by active duty military leaders; there was no real
planning function.
Until World War II, Presidential attention to military
affairs was episodic and fixed by diplomatic crises rather
than long-range military planning. (Congress stayed more
consistantly involved only because of the yearly budget
process, but there was seldom any long-range planning
involvement by that body, either.) At the beginning of the
19th Century Europe had embarked on another war, and
President Jefferson was forced to deal with the possibility
of U.S. involvement. He hoped to avoid involvement in the
wars by ignoring them. Fortunately for him, and for the
nation, a professional and competent U.S. Navy existed,
(having gained experience in the struggles with Barbary
pirates), and it was able to cope with initial U.S.
involvement in the world-wide power struggle while the
President and the nation absorbed the fact that non-
involvement was no longer possible.
It would have been best if U.S. involvement could have
been limited to naval action, but the presence of British
forces in contested areas, the danger of invasion, and ire
41 Allan R. Millett contends that these departments were
created primarily as part of the emerging system of party
politics and patronage. ("The American Political System and
Civilian Control of the Military," Mershon Center Position
Papers in the Policy Sciences, No. 4, April 1979, Mershon
Center of the Ohio State University.)
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aroused by apparent "slights" to the young nation's dignity
made it possible and even necessary to mobilize land
forces. ^2 congress authorized an increase in active forces to
35,000 men, but few signed up, and the states had varying
degrees of success, none very impressive, mobilizing their
militia. It was obvious that the concept of a citizen's
military responsibility to his country was largely
unaccepted. No special provisions were made for coping with
the increased demands on logistics and planning systems. It
was also obvious from the U.S. failure in most aspects of the
land war that there were serious weaknesses in the U.S.
military system.
In response to these apparent weaknesses Congress
reorganized the War Department in 1813, adding an embryonic
staff consisting of an adjutant general, a quartermaster
general, a commissary general of ordnance, a paymaster, an
assistant topographical engineer, and assistants for each of
these positions. This act was the first serious attempt at
removing military functions from the direct day-to-day
supervision of the Congress, and as such it constituted the
germ of a separate U.S. military planning system
42 There was some popular sentiment for the invasion of
Canada by U.S. forces, and an abortive attempt was made. It
failed because of the serious weaknesses of the disjointed
militia system. (Dale 0. Smith, U.S. M il itary Doctrine : a_
Study and Appraisal, Duell , Sloan, and Pearce, 1955)
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C. A NATION APART - 1815-1869
The Navy's part in the War of 1812 had been more
successful than the Army's largely due to a pre-existing
unitary command structure and experienced officers and crews.
Even here, however, it was apparent that modification of the
system to allow for inputs at the policy-making level by
active duty professionals was desirable, and in 1815 the
Secretary of the Navy was provided with a Board of Naval
Commissioners. Patterned after Britain's Naval Board, it
consisted of three senior line officers collectively
responsible, under the Secretary, for construction,
maintenance, supply, and similar functions in support of the
operating forces. The collective nature of this board and
its failure to delineate individual responsibilities,
however, led to a system wherein the active duty members were
charged with the direction of the civil administrative
functions and the civilian Secretary was responsible for
military policy matters. [Ref. 32]^3
43 Samuel Huntington contends that this was actually a
logical distribution of responsibilities because of the
relatively more technical expertise required by the
administrative functions, and the fact that professional
military officers were more likely to be technically and
scientifically skilled than a civilian political appointee.
(The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations, Harvard University Press"^ 1 957)
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Even with this re-organization of the War and Navy
Departments as a result of the lessons of the War of 1812,
there was no single professional military head of either
service until 1821, when the position of Commanding General
of the Army was created to provide for unity of command and
direction of military functions. To emphasize his military
authority, the Commanding General reported directly to the
President as Commander-in-Chief, while the members of the
staff were responsible to the Secretary. This arrangement led
to frequent power struggles over jurisdiction between the
Commanding General and the members of the staff, and the
Commanding General and the Secretary.
These power struggles were exacerbated by the increasing
politicizat ion of most Federal agencies during the era of
Jacksonian democracy. While during the early years of the
19th Century technical competence, (although not necessarily
military competence), had been the primary officer
qualifications, during the Jacksonian era militant enthusiasm
took its place. The system whereby senior officers selected
candidates for appointment to the Military Academy was
replaced by a system of political patronage appointments, and
political appointment to senior military rank in time of war
or raobilizatio-n became common. Such developments were not
conducive to the development of professional planning and
plan execution, and it says much for the leaders of the Army
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and Navy field forces during the Mexican American War that
they were able to comport themselves rather well with little
support or guidance from their seniors in Washington . ^^
In 1842 the Navy Department underwent a major
reorganization. Congress abolished the Board of Naval
Commissioners, replacing it with a bureau system which
substituted individual for collective responsibility,
creating a separate bureau for each major logistical function
and holding each bureau chief accountable for his technical
specialty. [ Ref. 331 Five bureaus were created: (1) Yards and
Docks; (2) Construction, Equipment, and Repair; (3)
Provisions and Clothing; (4) Ordnance and Hydrography; and
(5) Medicine and Surgery. Each bureau was directed by a
senior military officer with appropriate technical expertise,
and these bureau chiefs served as a "staff" to the Secretary
in the administration of Navy shore activities. The
Secretary retained responsibility for the operational
activities of the fleet, and no formal provision was made for
him to receive advice from senior officers on operational
matters
.
Not all politicians of the time lost sight of non-
political goals. As Secretary of War John C. Calhoun
r a t iona 1 i zed t he Army supply and procurement system,
vitalized an inspector-general position, and overhauled the
department's accounting system. His attempts to
professionalize military education and policy development,
however, were frustrated by Congress.
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The 1840's war with Mexico was short and relatively
straightforward, serving as a valuable exercise in
mobilization and large scale military operations. Its very
success was dangerous, however, leading to a degree of
complacency and a perpetuation of the belief that there was
no need for specific long-term planning procedures, and that
a war could be fought and won with the existing
organizational and command structure. ^ Thus at the outbreak
of the Civil War neither the Army or the Navy were organized
or staffed to cope with a major conflict. The Army in
particular started the war with a major operational handicap
caused by the loss of a number of professional officers to
the Confederate Army, including some whose value as both
senior strategists and experienced field commanders was a
sore loss.
The war erupted in confusion. No war plans existed,
certainly none designed to cope with a fragmented country and
a fragmented military force and logistics system. In
addition, at the beginning of the war there were few
4c
^Two extremely important factors that the more
optimistic analysts either failed to note or discounted as
irrelevant were that the war was of short duration, and was
fought predominantly by regular troops with experience in the
Indian wars led by regular officers trained in their
profession at the Military Academy.
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competent officers in positions of responsibility in the War
and Navy Departments because of the pol it icizat ion of the
system over the previous decades, and the increased
parochialism of bureau and staff "specialists" who often
spent entire careers in one narrow field rather than
developing a more generalized view of the needs of the
service. [Ref. 3^] Because seniority was the primary
criterion for advancement and there was no mandatory
retirement, the senior ranks were filled with older, more
consrvative, and sometimes physically infirm officers.
Mobilization filled the ranks with politically appointed
generals and colonels with little if any military experience.
A need for experienced and competent officers to advise
the Secretaries and the President in operational matters
became apparent early in the war. The Army's Commanding
General fulfilled such a function in regard to land forces,
but the Navy lacked such a postion. The post of Assistant
Secretary was created to deal with strategy and operations,
and a retired Navy Captain was assigned to the position. He
became the Navy's chief strategist, with direct access to the
President. He had no operational authority, however. In
addition, in 1862 the number of bureaus was increased from
five to eight,, and during the course of the war a number of
ad hoc temporary boards were established.
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The un preparedness for major conflict and consequent
disorganized management of early years of the war caused
severe problems of corruption and incompetence, particularly
in the logistics arena. Attempts at professional planning
were undermined by political involvement, especially on the
part of Congress. A special Congressional Committee on the
Conduct of the War was established whose members, apparently
harkening to earlier traditions of statesmen as military
leaders, seemed certain that their capabilities as military
strategists were at least the equal of the generals.
As a result of the lack of an institutionalized planning
system to cope with the stresses of mobilization, the war was
fought on a month-to-month, or at least year-to-year, basis.
No provisions were made for the post-war period, based on the
presumption that the huge wartime armies and logistics system
would simply melt back into society and the country could
return to a simple peacetime existence uncomplicated by
military needs beyond frontier forces and naval patrols.
With the exception of a few troops for "occupation" purposes,
this is what happened. The wartime administration and ad_ hoc
boards were dissolved, in 1869 the post of Assistant
Secretary of the Navy was abolished, and the professional
military went- back to their remote outposts and stations,
removed from the public eye.
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The military and naval forces of the U.S. were largely
isolated from government activities and their fellow citizens
from 1865 to the end of the century. The only time they were
remembered was during a period of minor concern over the
Cuban revolt of 1868, hastily reconsidered thoughts of war
with Spain sparked by the arrest and execution by Spanish
authorities in 1873 of U.S. seamen serving as crew of a ship
chartered by Cuban rebels, ^^ and peripherally during the
naval build-up of the 1880's and 1890's. The earlier (pre-
Civil War) division of the officer corps into technical
specialties divided the military and built bridges with
civilian counterparts, and discouraged the creation of a
single set of criteria by which an American military officer
could guage his professionalism. Although there were
significant examples of military thought, writing, and
societies from 1832-1846, (a period referred to by Samuel
Huntington as the American Military Enlightenment), these
activities constituted an awareness only, with little
connected institutional reform.
^John A.S.Gr en V i 1 1 e and George Berkeley Young, in
Politic s
,
Strategy, and Am erican D iplo m acy.- Studies in
b'oreign Policy, 1873'^n^l7 (Yale University Press, 196TT
indicate that the lack of preparedness for dealing with even
a minor power such as Spain convinced policy-makers of the
need to deal with the situation by diplomatic means, and
probably sparked some early concern for Naval reform.
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D. ENTERING THE WORLD STAGE - 1870-1918
By the post-Civil War period this had changed. According
to Sir John Hackett:
"The years between 1860 and World War I saw the emergence
of a distinctive American professional military ethic, with
the American officer regarding himself as a member no
longer of a fighting profession only, to which anybody
might belong, but as a member of a learned profession whose
students are students for life." [Ref.35]
This creation of a professional identity led to an
emphasis on the importance of developing a doctrine of war
for American forces. In the United States, military policy
depended on civilian statesmanship. It was the function of
the civilian policy-maker to determine the ends of national
policy and to allocate resources. It was the job of the
military to apply its share of these resources to the
achievement of assigned goals. Most importantly, the
determination of national goals had to precede decisions on
strategy.
Because of the lack of civilian guidance on strategy, the
U.S. military began to create a professional system and
strategy, on its own. Studies were made of the European
military estabilishments. A number of professional societies
and journals were established emphasizing the military rather
than the technical aspects of professionalism. The Army
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established advanced professional schools, and in June 187^
Congress passed the Marine Schools Act to improve maritime
training and preparedness.^*^
The most significant institutional reforms of the period
were the establishment of the Naval War College in 1884 and
the slightly later establishment of the Army War College in
1903. The original function of these institutions was to
provide a forum for professional thought and the development
of military strategy. There was serious opposition to the
War Colleges from both civilian and military policy-makers,
who felt that the establishment of military strategy-making
bodies was an encroachment on what must remain a civilian
preserve. Despite this opposition, and the planning vacuum
from a lack of civilian guidance in the form of articulated
goals, the War Colleges not only survived, but became the
sources of the country's first real war plans and, upon the
outbreak of war with Spain in 1898, the Navy War College
plannning documents formed the basis for U.S. actions.
While the military was developing its own internal
professional planning system. Congress and the public became
aware of the need for and desirability of an improved naval
47
'These reforms were not unopposed in Congress. Members
argued that military professional training should be confined
to the Military and Naval Academies. (John A.S.Grenville and
George Berkeley Young, Pol i
t
ics , Strateg y , and Am er ican




establishment. For the first hundred years of the nation's
existence the basic naval strategy was based upon the
assumption that the need for naval forces in any war
involving the U.S. against a foreign power would begin with a
foreign aggressor coming to sack U.S. coastal cities and
occupy key coastal areas. The Strategy designed to cope with
this had consisted of stationing a few warships, mostly small
monitors, at each major port, and augmenting them by fixed
coastal batteries. Several high seascruisers were to be
available to interrupt the sea communications and logistics
of the enemy. The development of new techniques such as
steam, long-range rockets, explosive shells, and armor-plated
steel made a change in tactics necessary. In future the
fleet would have to operate as a concentrated unit, seeking
and destroying the opposition on the high seas rather than
being dispersed to small, vulnerable outposts. This would
require major changes in the composition of the fleet.
Awareness of a need for change in defensive tactics may
have been the element which prompted most concern for reform
among naval thinkers, but Congressional debates on the issue
of the composition and use of the fleet were also based on
the broadening of U.S. involvement in world trade. The
publication in. 1890 of Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of
Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 sparked popular enthusiasm
for the idea of the responsibility of a mercantile power to
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extend its influence, and one of the first steps in the
fulfillment of that responsiibil i ty was the creation of a
powerful navy capable of both world-wide commerce protection
and credible power projection.
In 1890 Navy Secretary Benjamin F. Tracy created- a Naval
Policy Board of six senior active duty officers to coordinate
the Navy's part in the debate over strategy and fleet
composition, and that same year the Board issued a report
advocating a large battleship fleet. ^S This combination of
naval and Congressional sentiments for change in fleet
composition and a resulting change in tactics formed the
basis for a much-needed fleet modernization program, and
contributed to American successes in the later war with
Spain.
Despite this naval modernization program, the U.S. was
not really prepared to go to war with Spain in 1898.
Existing warplans were largely impractical, being based on a
philosophy unsupportable given resource cons traints.^9 The
Array initially attempted to deal with mobilization and
planning using the existing organization structure, but by
21 o
"Despite its apparent success as an advisory body, the
Naval PolicyBoard could not survive the internicene
struggles of the bureaus, and it was disestablished in only a
few years. (Vincent Davis, The_ Admira l's Lobby, The
University of North Carolina Press, 196?)
^9see later sections for a discussion of war plans in
existence at the time.
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1899 it was obvious to Secretary of War Elihu Root that this
system could not cope with the requirements of a modern war.
In that year he completely restructured the senior policy-
making system of the War Department and the Army, abolishing
the position of Commanding General and creating the position
of Chief of Staff of the Array. The occupant of the position
was to serve as the principal military advisor to the
President. Secretary Root also took action to abolish direct
command access to the president and extend the Chief of
Staff's control over the bureaus, eliminating the intra-
departmental chaos resulting from bureau power struggles,
(which he felt had contributed to Army failures early in the
Spanish American War), and also eliminating the conflict over
direct access to the President which had existed between the
Secretary and the Commanding General. To support the Chief
of Staff, in 1903 he created a General Staff designed to be
"capable of studying the larger problems of military science
and making a systematic preparation of war plans. "[Ref. 37]
Navy Secretary John Long was saved from having to take
such drastic measures by the existence within the Navy
Department of an informal strategy-making forum consisting of
Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt and three senior
officers. Although they had evidently been meeting
informally for some time, on 23 March 1898 they met for the
first time as a formally constituted Naval War Board, with
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the responsibility of advising the Navy Secretary on
questions of strategy. 50 This body was only formalized as a
wartime agency, but its previous peacetime existence lent it
the ability to deal with post-war strategy as well as
shorter-term wartime planning, unlike previous planning
agencies
.
The success of the Naval War Board and the recognition,
(prompted by the war), of a need for improved staffing led to
the issuance in 1900 of General Order 544, creating a General
Board tasked with advising the Navy Secretary on "war plans,
ship construction, and the operation of the f leet ." [ Ref .38 ]
This General Board was heir to both the Navy War Board and a
group of ad h o c_ boards which had been created by the
Secretaries during the 1880's and I890's to design long-range
plans for the over-all development and orderly expansion of
the Navy. (These boards had never been formalized because of
strong opposition from bureau chiefs to what they feared as a
dilution of their influence.)
In 1903 the first official efforts at peace time joint
planning were made with the Creation of the Joint Army and
^^Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, although the junior, was
the dominant m.ember of this board. He recommended that the
Secretary abolish the Board and replace it with a single
Chief of Staff. His recommendation was not accepted. (John
A.S.Grenville and George Berkeley Yount, Politics, Strategy,
and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 )
Yale Universi ty Press, 1 966)
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Navy Board (Joint Board.) Stringent limitations were placed
on this body, however, and it early years were not notably
successful. It was assigned no staff of its own, it could
consider only those matters which the Secretaries
specifically put before it, and it could make recommendations
only to the services and the Secretaries. Its primary
concern was with the internal development of joint war plans
and the acquisition of overseas bases.
The earliest formal war plans, created by the Naval War
College and used in the Spanish-American War, focused on the
Caribbean as the most likely place for a conflict with the
primary threat European powers. As early as 1892 the War
College had begun studying the strategic implications of a
war with Spain, working with the young Office of Naval
Intelligence, created in 1882. The early plans postulated
that the U.S. could not possibly be defeated unless the enemy
were allowed to gain and maintain a strong base in the
Western Hemisphere. The main naval battle would be in the
Florida Straits, where the U.S. Fleet would both protect the
future isthmian canal and prevent Spanish forces from
improving their basing situation.
The plan also optimistically projected offensive action
against Spain in the Mediterranean, with chartered British
colliers providing logistics support. Action in the Far East
would be based on Manila. The fighting role was assigned to
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the Navy rather than the Army. This was attractive from a
diplomatic and sentimental point of view rather than a purely
strategic point of view, and it had the added attractiveness
of promising fewer American casualties at less cost.
Existence of the plan was known only to Secretary Long and
chiefs of the Navy Department because of a fear of being seen
as "over-prepared."
Although the main threat was seen as Spanish activity in
the Western Hemisphere, there was some secondary concern
about Japanese expansionism as early as 1893. Planners were
faced with a serious dilemma, however; there were not thought
to be enough naval forces to deal with concurrent major
action in the Caribbean and Far East, Navy war plans of the
period before the Spanish American War called for holding Far
Eastern logistics facilities on a temporary basis only. When
the war did occur, one group of planners, led by Alfred
Thayer Mahan, tried to convince the President that the U.S.
should hold only the island of Luzon. Another group wanted
to annex the entire Philippines, then cede all of it but
Luzon to Britain in exchange for the Bahamas, Jamaica, while
simultaneously acquiring the Danish West Indies. All plans
identified the necessity for maintaining the friendship of
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the British if the U.S. position in the Far East was to be
tenable. 5'' The entire Philippins were annexed because of
political rather than strategic considerations.
Post-war planning continued to emphasize European threats
to the Western Hemisphere. The Navy's General Board took as
its first task the listing of desired bases in the Caribbean,
particularly Cuba, and stressed a need to maintain strength
there and in Puerto Rico to bracket the unstable countries of
Haiti and Santo Domingo. Plans were developed whereby the
Navy could seize ports in the area in order to land American
forces. Ambitions were still unrealistic, however. A paper
published in the spring of 1901 pointed out U.S. limitations
even within the hemisphere, proposing that U.S. forces could
only assert positive control as far as the mouth of the
Orinoco, with doubtful control possible as far as the Amazon.
Beyond the Amazon U.S. control was not feasible. [Ref. 40]
Despite this documented study of limitations, and the
existence of an unbalanced force of new battleships and too
few auxilaries to support them, in 1903 the General Board
drew up war studies for the defense of the Philippines, the
seizure of a China base, and an attack on the French in
S 1
-^
'There were occasional warnings from Mahanians that
Britain, as the chief economic rival of the U.S., was also
the chief threat. The reality of U.S. dependence on British
power in the Far East countered this concern..
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Indochina, while still contending that the most vital need
was to provide for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and
the Atlantic and Caribbean areas, with Germany now seen as
the primary threat. (Even the 1903 war plans for the Far East
postulated a European threat; Japan was a secondary concern
at this point.) The battleship fleet was therefore
concentrated in the Atlantic, and the forces in the Far East
were left in an exposed position.
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was a water-shed in
American military planning. The Japanese threat suddenly
became more tangible, and President Theodore Roosevelt
commissioned the expansion of war plans dealing with a
possible threat to U.S. interests in China. The U.S.
position in the Philippines took on new importance, and the
Army and Navy began to fight over the relative priority of
their position in the islands. As early as 1904 War Plan
Orange, postulating a Japanese threat, began to show a more
realistic grasp of the Pacific situation, recognizing the
fact that the defense of the Philippines would consist of an
initial loss of the islands with the exception of the army
bastion of Corregidor, and the gradual retaking of the area.
(This plan survived basically intact through its last
revision in 1938.)
In 1907 President Theodore Roosevelt sent a force of
battleships and escorts on an around-the-world cruise to
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"show the flag," and to impress upon the Japanese the
existence of a formidable U.S. naval power. An unexpected
result of the journey of this Great White Fleet was the
discovery of a greater than anticipated independence of shore
logistics. This prompted a change in strategic thinking on
the need for overseas bases and led to the development of an
"advance base" concept wherein the first goal of U.S. forces
in the event of probable hostilities would be to seize an
advance operating base in the area. This type of plan
required the cooperation of the Army, and the Joint Board of
the Army and Navy thus began its first serious involvement in
strategic planning.
Awareness of the potential for world upheaval had
directed the attention of policy-makers to a continuing need
for the modernization of the military planning system as
early as 1909, when Navy Secretary George V.L.Meyers
reorganized his department along functional lines. He
created four "aides" with functional responsibility cutting
across bureau lines to work directly under the Secretary.
The executive and administrative responsibilities vested in
the Aide for Operations led to an increasing degree of
centralization of authority, with this position soon
transcending the other three.
By 1913 Germany's position as a serious Atlantic invasion
threat was acknowledged by War Plan Black. The threat was
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over-estimated, discounting the long logistics line the
Germans would have to maintain to reach the western Atlantic
or Caribbean. Fear of this unrealistic threat reflected the
continued existence of an "Atlanticist" bent in American
thinking, and again threw the hard-won balance of Atlantic
versus Pacific threat perception out of alignment.
Historically Americans have seldom been reluctant to
support a foreign policy that would lead to war, but they
have been consistantly reluctant to support a military policy
that would prepare the nation for war. [Ref. 41] This was
not entirely the case in the second decade of the 20th
Century, however. President Wilson and his followers were
determined that the U.S. should remain aloof from the
increasing turmoil in Europe. Significant portions of the
American public had begun to sense the potentially negative
aspects of world responsibility which came with the
acquisition of an "empire," and popular sentiment for strict
non-involvement existed throughout the country. ^^
President Wilson, upon his election in 1912 refused to
allow any military preparedness programs, and threatened to
abolish all military planning boards as a provocation to war.
52 As a nation of immigrants of diverse origins, the
United States based part of its justification for non-
involvement on the basis that immigrant communities
represented both sides of any European conflict. It was
therefore impractical to establish support for either side.
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When the Navy's General Board attempted to provide him with
unsolicited advice he threatened to fire all the members, and
only the reputation and diplomatic skill of board chairman
Admiral Dewey saved the body from dissolution. After 1913
the Joint Board of the Army and Navy ceased to play any role
in military planning, and the individual services' planning
bodies were forced to do their work covertly.
By 1915 German policies and the increased obviousness of
threat prompted members of Congress to look more favorably
on preparedness. The pendulum of public opinion had swung
this direction by the I9I6 election year, and even President
Wilson was forced to weaken his nonalignment stance.
American inexperience in strategic thinking was apparent in
the selection of preparedness policies, however. As early as
the previous Taft administration proposals had been made for
the establishment of a high-level inter-departmental planning
body reflecting the complexity of modern conflict management.
This Council of National Defense was to have included the
Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the chairmen of the
Senate and House Military and Naval committees, and the
presidents of the Army and Navy War Colleges. At the time of
the initial proposal the State Department had fought against
it, fearing that the creation of too powerful a centralized
strategy-making body would destroy the safeguards of the
"checks-and-balances" of the existing system of diversified
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planning agencies. When Congress finally did create a
Council of National Defense in 1916, it was concerned largely
with economic mobilization rather than general defense
strategy. [Ref. 42]
Internally, the Navy Department was strengthening its
functional orientation. In 19I6 the official position of
Chief of Naval Operations was created by Congress. Loyalty
to the individual bureau system had not diminished, but the
creation of the new position, (a successor to the Aide for
Operations), was a victory for that faction within the Navy
which saw a need for concentration in a single officer of the
authority to direct strategic planning for fleet operations.
As written, the bill made the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
responsible for planning and preparing for the use of the
fleet in war, but did not grant him the authority to issue
operational orders. Bureau chiefs, with their strong pre-
existing power structures, guarded their own direct access to
the Secretary and Congress and their authority over the
respective components of the shore establishment, and the
Navy Secretary and CNO became natural allies as the only two
centralized authorities in a traditionally decentralized
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organization. 53 (in 1919 a War Plans Division was created
under CNO, but most of his fifteen assistants became involved
in administrative rather than planning duties.)
Meanwhile the General Staff and General Board continued
to plan in a vacuum, preparing not for World War I but for a
war that might follow Germany's victory in Europe. Because
of the long-standing American tradition of no alliances, the
possibility of cooperation with other forces in a European
theater was neglected, and plans were concentrated on the
threat of German invasion of the Western Hemisphere, probably
coming through beachheads established in Mexico, Haiti, and
Santo Domingo, Because the President did not let his
strategists share in the formulation of policy, the country
was again largely unprepared for entry into World War I when
it came. [Ref. 43]
During the war the Army's centralized General Staff
system proved incapable of coping with the complexities of
modern warfare. In 1918 it underwent significant internal
reorganization, and a new Divison of Purchasing, Storage, and
^^RADM Bradley Fiske, the Aide for Operations during the
Taft administration, was a prime mover in the establishment
of the position of CNO. He was also active in other reform
activities, and his insistance on trying to advise his
superiors when they didn't want to be advised ruined his
career. (John A.S.Grenville and George Berkeley Young,
Politics
,
Strategy, and Am erican Diplo m acy : Studies in
Foreign Policy, 1873-1917
,
Yale University Press, 1916)
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Traffic was created. The division was ostensibly part of the
General Staff, but it actually functioned under the direct
control of the Secretary of War, reflecting a perceived need
to plan and manage logistics functions separately from the
"purely military" functions. In 1919 the Joint Board was
significantly reorganized and reactivated, and its apparent
success as a joint planning agency led to the creation of the
Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board in 1922.
A study of the years from the close of the Civil War to
1917 leads to the conclusion that the harmonization of
strategy and foreign policy was more often a matter of chance
than design. [Ref. 393 Excessive regard for political
advantage and lack of attention to strategy on the part of
civilian policy-makers considerably handicapped American
diplomacy. In the absence of guidance, these strategists,
who looked at the world from a Mahanian viewpoint, built the
strategy and supporting war plans around the only two
articulated major foreign policies the United States held;
the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door Policy. 54
•^^Proponants of Mahan's theories believed that all naval
plans should originate with these two policies, and that
their defense-was essential to the national interest. The
Army, with its continental tradition, was more closely tied
to the Monroe Doctrine and the protection of the hemisphere,
but the Navy viewed both as absolute interests. (Richard D.
Challener
,
Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy,
1898-1914, Princeton University Press, 1973)
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E. INTERLUDE BETWEEN WARS - 1919-1940
The lessons of World War I in regard to planning,
organization, and management of military forces had little
lingering impact after the war. Wartime forces were
demobilized and sent home, and regulars returned to their
physically remote outposts. The only major industry
retaining significant interest in the peace-time military
establishment was the ship-building industry. 55 Attempts to
retain some degree of readiness resulted in the passage of
the National Defense Act of 1920, which defined the primary
peacetime mission of the regular Army as the training of the
National Guard and Organized Reserves, and established the
Reserve Officer Training Corps. Funding constraints soon
crippled these programs.
By 1924 funds had been cut so drastically that the Navy
was forced to institute a policy allocating material funds to
repair and maintenance only, shelving all building,
modernization, and alteration plans. Both services had to
curtail operations severly, and since no money was available
for exercises, plans were again based on theory and
^-'Stephen E. Ambrose notes the significance to military
preparedness of the fact that in the U.S. military power over
industry is derivative, having no control over actual
production. ( The M ilitary and Am erican Society
,
The Free
Press, 1972) Proponents of the concept of a "military-
industrial complex" would argue that this lack of direct
control is irrelevant, especially since World War II.
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speculation rather than firm capabilities. Logistics
systems, which were in reality almost non-existent, were
"assumed" for planning purposes. 56
Any lessons about the value of coordination between
military and diplomatic policy makers seem to have been lost.
There was no agency for coordination between the State
Department and the Departments of War and Navy between the
end of the war and 1938, when a State-War-Navy conference on
Latin America concerns and hemispheric defense led to the
creation of the Standing Liaison Committee, consisting of the
service chiefs and the Under Secretary of State. In
addition, for the first time the services were embroiled in
serious internal disputes over the allocation of scarce
resources. These disputes stemmed from the appearance during
the war of air power as a significant consideration.
Traditionalists who saw air power as merely a supplement to
existing forces and air power advocates who saw it as a
^^Walter Millis states that until the end of 1937 at
least. Army and Navy planning proceeded in a vacuum, with the
Joint Board "color" plans upon which threat assessment and
strategy were based consisting mainly of theoretical plans
for largely non-existent forces. (Arms and the State , The
Twentieth Century Fund, 1958)
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revolutionary strategic and tactical change engaged in
philosophical and political battles which damaged their
public credibility and unity. 57
Despite the usual post-war American withdrawal into
hemispheric isolationism in the 1920's and 1930's, by the end
of the latter decade it had become obvious that non-
involvement in the new war in Europe would not be practical
much longer. During the three years from Munich to Pearl
Harbor, public opinion, carefully fostered by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, became more sympathetic to actions in
aid of Allied forces. Military opinion seemed to lag behind
general public opinion in willingness to support hostile
actions by a supposedly neutral power, but there was good
reason for this. Military planners and policy-makers were
well aware of the deplorable state of U.S. readiness.
Not until 1937 could President Roosevelt convince
Congress to increase allocations for naval building programs
and other defense programs, (in the Fiscal Year 39 budget.)
In the meantime, war plan revisions began to identify Japan
as a primary threat but, in recognition of stretched
57 Army air power advocates had more success than did
their Navy counterparts. The Air Corps Act of 1926 gave Army
aviators almost virtual autonomy in organization and
planning, but the creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics in
1921 kept Naval aviators firmly within the existing bureau
system and subject to the budgeting priorities of the
"battleship Navy" proponents who occupied senior positions.
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resources planned for an initial loss of the Philippines and
a withdrawal to an Alaska/Ha waii/ Panama defense line and
Asiatic basing for the fleet. In 1937 the Director of the
Navy War Plans Division, Captain Ingersoll, was sent to
London for"secret informal conversations" during which the
possibility of a Pacific war was discussed, and concern
expressed by the British about having to deplete their
Asiatic forces to cope with a German threat. War Plan Orange
(Japanese threat) was revised to assume British cooperation
if an offensive against Japan became necessary. This was the
beginning of Anglo-American strategic and tactical naval
cooperation, representing a major break with traditional U.S.
isolationist policy, and there was some disapproval in
Congress when the rumor of Captain Ingersoll's visit surfaced
in mid-1938. [Ref. 44] By this time. Congress had become
well convinced of the potential threat, however, and the
continuation of "informal conversations" was allowed. At the
same time Army planners began to change their plan
orientation from a passive, tactical approach to a broader-
based strategic concept of preventive defense. In 1940 the
U.S. and Canada established the Permanent Joint Board on
Defense to deal with matters of common interest.
F. A NEW WAY OF WAR - 194I-I945
Civilian control of the military had always been an
unquestioned part of the American system. In previous wars
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this concept had included the involvement, even in wartime,
of senior civilian policy-makers in most aspects of military
operations, excluding only battlefield tactics.
(Congressional investigations sometimes even dealt with this
aspect, although only as an after-the-fact examination rather
than as policy guidance.)
Samuel Huntington found three key aspects of American
civil-military relations in World War II which differed from
previous wars: (1) concerning major decisions of policy and
strategy, the military ran the war; (2) the military
apparently ran the war just the way the American people and
statesmen wanted it run; and (3) on the domestic front,
control over economic mobilization was shared between
military and civilian agencies. [Ref. 45] Although in theory
the diplomats and statesmen would provide the framework for
contingency planning and thus produce "military
requirements," the reality of World War II was that once
military operations had begun the civilian policy-makers
turned over all operational planning to the military. 58
CO
-'"There are a variety of theories why this occured, among
which are the idea that the increased complexity of
technology convinced civilian policy-makers to leave war
planning to the "experts," or, more pessimistically, the idea
that civilian" pol icy-maker s , many of whom were elected or
politically appointed officials, were quite willing to let
military decision-makers take the risk of making a "wrong"
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President Franklin Roosevelt, although estensibly a
"civilian policy-maker" actually identified himself in his
military role of Commander-in-Chief in connection with war
planning. In 1939 he reorganized the Executive Office of the
President, creating a "paper" Office of Emergency Management,
and strengthened and reinforced his direct line to the
military. He also transferred several strategic and joint
planning agencies to the Executive Office of the President,
and established a War Resources Board to review existing
planning programs. 59 His strong and often pre-emptive
actions sometimes overwhelmed Congress and the military
establishment. In 19^0 he activated the National Guard,
stationed the Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor, and began
substantial military assistance to the Allies, In 19^1 he
established the Lend-Lease program, mobilized the Philippine
armed forces, and began an undeclared ASW war against German
5°(cont) judgement. Actually, it was probably just the
culmination of the long-standing trend of strengthening
executive branch involvement and weakening legislative branch
involvement in foreign affairs.
5^The board made five principal findings: (1) that there
be a minimum number of agencies; (2) that they be staffed by
selected capable executive personnel; (3) that the status quo
of priorities among agencies be maintained; (4) that the
powers of the-agencies be covered by statutes or Executive
Orders; and (5) that there be a system of coordination among
the agencies, but that the President rather than some "super-
agency" act as final arbiter. These recommendations were
never really formally implemented, although in practice they
were followed. (Clark R. Mollenhoff, The Pentagon: Politics,
Profits and Plunder
,
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967)
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submarines in the Atlantic. Throughout the war he remained
closely involved in military strategic planning. His
involvement was endorsed by Congress, which gave him
authority with the First War Powers Act (December 18, 19^1)
to create, abolish, and reorganize executive agencies for the
duration of the war. On March 27, 19^2 the Second War Powers
Act authorized him to requisition and allocate materials and
facilities and enforce priorities.^
On September 11, 19^1 the Joint Board of the Army and
Navy issued a "Joint Board Estimate of Over-all Production
Requirements" in which the major national objectives of the
United States were identified as follows:
"...preservation of the territorial, economic and
ideological integrity of the United States and of the
remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the
disruption of the British Empire; prevention of the further
extension of Japanese territorial dominion; eventual
establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which
will most nearly ensure political stability in those
regions and the future security of the United States; and,
so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes
favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty.
[Ref. 46]
This second War Powers Act did not pass without some
debate, and the Senate created a Special Committee
Investigating the National Defense Force, (called the Truman
Committee), to provide for Congressional aid and involvement
with their interests in the armed forces. Relations between
the Committee 'and the President were usually amicable, and
the existence of the Committee helped reassure the public
that their interests were being guarded. (Walter Millis, Arms
and the State, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958)
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In addition to this major policy document, three other
documents were published in the fall of 19^1 in response to
criticism that the military refused or was unable, to supply a
firm list of requirements. An Anglo-American "balance sheet"
showed existing stocks and projected production of major
military items; another, shown only to the President,
consisted of a strategic estimate of how we would win the war
if we entered; a third Victory Plan listed materials needed
to carry out the proposed strategy.
Military plans were still based on assumed values, as
civilian policy-makers did not provide any firm requirements
or priorities. Key elements were derived from civilian
values because of American historical precedent; (and from
secret U.S. -British strategic agreements): (1) the military
defeat of the Axis to the exclusion of all else; (2) the
postponement of political decisions until after the war; (3)
the necessity for unconditional surrender, and (4) the
priority of the defeat of Germany over the defeat of Japan
(the elimination of evil as opposed to greater strategic
considerations). As war planning and the war progressed the
values and assumptions of the President began to be written
into the thinking of the top military policy-makers, although
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on lower levels the more traditional professional ethic
remained intact. ^
The Joint Board was closely involved in pre-war planning,
but a basic restructure of the coordinative planning body was
made necessary by the creation early in the war of an Anglo-
American Combined Chiefs of Staff, to be located in
Washington. This body was subject only to the direction of
the President and Prime Minister, and was to settle questions
of joint strategy, issue strategic direction, and establish
and direct a unified command structure.
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, created as part of this
system, differed from its predecessor Joint Board in three
major respects. First, it was for practical purposes a
command organization, not merely a planning body or liaison
committee. Second, it had a more highly developed system of
sub-committees, staff, and secretariat. The old Operational
Planning Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff
Samuel Huntington contends that this virtual
elimination of conventional military wisdom at high policy
levels as a balance to the President's basically civilian
strategic wisdom was a prime deficiency in World War II
planning, and even more so in post-war planning, (or rather
the lack of post-war planning.) The U.S. traded military
security for military victory. ( The Soldier and the State ;






became the War Plans Division (WPD), the Washington' command
post of the President's Chief of Staff, General Marshall. A
number of new joint planning agencies were created: JSP
(Joint Staff Planners), JSSC (Joint Strategic Survey
Committee), and the JWPC (Joint War Plans Committee), all of
which were channels for the submission of policy papers to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Third, the JCS included the Commanding General, Army Air
Forces as a co-equal member, (although Commander in Chief,
U.S. Fleet, Admiral King still insisted on appealing from Air
Corps General Arnold to Army Chief of Staff Marshall on
questions of strategy.) [Ref. 4?] The closeness of JCS
philosophy to that of the President was shown when he over-
ruled their strategic decisions on only three occasions
throughout the war.
Both the Army and the Navy planning and policy-making
structures underwent significant modification during the war.
The Army General Staff was liquidated with the exception of:
OPD, which became WPD under General Marshall; G-1 (Personnel)
and G-2 (Intelligence). The remaining staff offices were
functionally combined with operating bureaus. Three grand
organizational groupings were created: Army Ground Forces,
Army Air Forces, and the Service of Supply, (which later
became the Array Service Forces.) In the Navy, the position
of Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet was created in December
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19^1 to ease the Chief of Naval Operations' dual load of
operational and administrative duties. CNO was tasked with
long-range plans and the Commander-in-Chief with current war
plans. Confusion over priorities and lines of authority and
responsibility led to the recombination of the positions in
March 19^2, and the creation of a Vice CNO to free the
Commander -i n-Ch i e f/ Ch i e f of Naval Operations for the
strategic and operational direction of the war by handling
administrative and logistics matters.
Victory in World War II left the United States a global
power committed to participation in world affairs and
needing to transform its attitudes and traditions about war
and foreign affairs. With the emergence of a strong military
establishment, and the complexities of coalition warfare and
coalition peace, came problems for which neither traditional
military doctrine nor existing plans furnished a solution.
The need for a fundamental change in U.S. military and
strategic planning became apparent.
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IV. PLANNING AS A GLOBAL POWER - 1945-1968
A. PRELUDE TO CHANGE
The great technological and systemic changes that took
place during, and especially at the end of, World War II
changed the entire world of the American military planner.
While, as Edward Luttwak notes, until after World War II the
United States had scant need of strategy beyond the technical
functions associated with "war planning," the integration of
the political, social, economic, and military factors of the
"world system" brought about by the war's technological
developments created an unexplored environment. [Ref.48]
Separation of the military aspects of planning from the
political and economic, a keystone of the American military
planning system since the Civil War, was no longer possible.
The most novel element of this new environment was the
necessity for a constant high level of military forces to
meet new international responsibilities. This gave the
military greater stature within the government and the nation
than it was accustomed to holding during peace. It also
forced the uniformed military into the unfamilar role of
military statesmen. [Ref. 49]63 Eventually the War Colleges
63 U.S. military officers had served as administrators of
American interests around the world for many years, but with
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were re-shaped to meet this new need, as the old function of
training commanders for success in battle receded, but the
Generals and Admirals of the late 1940's and early 1950's
were largely opposed to what they perceived as a dilution of
perfessionalism.
A revolution in military technology forced a system for
centralized planning and directing of the vastly broadened
military programs. ^^ Yet the increased importance of
military affairs was not accompanied by a narrowing of the
range of actors involved in defense policy-making. The usual
post-war resurgence of civilian intervention in the internal
management of U.S. standing forces began immediately after
hostilities ended. This time, however, one of the first
steps taken was the formalization of what previously had been
a largely political process. To paraphrase Clemenceau, not
only had war become too important to be left to the generals;
so had the peacetime defense system.
63 (cont)the possible exception of Commodore Perry and a
few of the officers in the Far East they had seldom been
called upon to be involved in major international policy
decisions without the advice, or more often the direction, of
the State Department.
°It is something of a misnomer to speak of a "military
program" after World War II. Despite early post-war
reformers^ allusions to a National Military Establishment, it
has been virtually impossible since the National Security Act
of 1947 to treat the uniformed military as an entity separate
from the larger "national defense" system.
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In creating a new centralized planning and directing
system for national defense, one of the first steps was to
attempt unification of the military establishment. There
were three schools of thought on unification: (1) those
primarily interested in improving the military effectiveness
of the armed forces; (2) those primarily interested in
economic efficiency; and (3) those primarily interested in
greater administrative efficiency. [Ref. 50] All these
arguments were used to great effect by supporters of
unification.
As early as October 19^3 General Marshall began a study
of post-war military arrangements and conditions. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff also established a Special Committee for the
Reorganization of National Defense, and interviewed a number
of general staff officers and other informed personnel.
While most senior officers of the Army saw the inevitability
and desirability of some integrated military system for the
future, powerful forces in the Navy were strongly opposed to
such a move because of their fear of having the nation's
maritime power in the hands of decision-makers who would not
know how to use it properly. 65
65 The Air Corps element of the Army supported unification
because they envisioned a role for air forces within the new
system equal to that of ground forces and naval forces, and
encompassing all of the Navy's non-carrier air missions and
all Marine Corps air missions.
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In March 19^4 a House select committee chaired by
Representative Clifton A. Woodrum began to accept testimony
on proposed postwar military policy. Secretary of War
Stimson adduced the Army's positive views on unification,
despite the Joint Chief's committee's inability to resolve
the problem to their satisfaction. Navy witnesses continued
to oppose unification.
Despite opposition within his department, Navy Secretary
Forrestal commissioned a study by Ferdinand Eberstadt on
post-war reorganization. (Strong sentiment in Congress made
it apparent that a reorganization was going to take place).
He emphasized his concern that any military reorganization
must also include the higher organization of political,
diplomatic, industrial, and economic factors. This study
proposed a reorganization providing for three separate
services but no single integrated defense department. The
three services would be linked to the State Department
through a National Security Council, which would correlate
the activities of all four agencies. Newly created joint
agencies would integrate the military services' functions of
economic, intelligence, and production planning. [Ref.
51]
Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins prepared the Army's
views. Although more sketchy than the Eberstadt proposals,
this study called for a single military department, a single
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secretary, and a single Chief of Staff of the armed forces to
serve as an advisor and executive agent for the Secretary.
[Ref. 52]
B. BUILDING A STRUCTURE - 1945-1952
After viewing both studies, President Truman approved a
plan combining elements of both. He accepted the Eberstadt
study's plan for higher organization, but preferred the
Collins study's ideas on service unification. It was this
compromise plan which he submitted to Congress in late 19^5
as a tentative proposal for a strong post-war military
organization and a merger of the armed forces under a single
Department of National Defense. °" This department was to
have a Secretary of cabinet rank, an Under Secretary, and
several Assistant Secretaries. The military forces would be
separated into three coordinate branches -- land forces,
naval forces, and air forces -- each under an Assistant
Secretary. Each branch would have a military commander, and
these three, together with the Chief of Staff of the
Department of National Defense, the senior uniformed
representative, would serve as an advisory body to the
Secretary and President. [Ref. 53]
Congress was at the time reorganizing its own part in
the defense policy process. The National Reorganization Act
of 1946 combined into a single committee the Military and
Naval Affairs Committees in each house, as it also combined
each house's Army and Navy Appropriations Committees.
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Neither Secretary of War Patterson nor Navy Secretary
Forrestal were satisfied with this compromise. The Array was
willing to accept most Navy ideas for higher organization,
including a National Security Council, a National Security
Resources Board, and a Central Intelligence Agency. The Navy
Recognized that there would probably have to be an over-all
defense "director" or Secretary. Two obstacles remained: (1)
the Army insisted the defense Secretary be in charge of the
entire establishment, while the Navy insisted he be only a
"coordinator" with no executive authority or separate
department; and (2) the Navy felt vulnerable on its rights to
own its own air assets and maintain a separate Marine Corps.
[Ref. 54]
In June 1946, the President agreed to review a revised
organization plan based on discussions with his Secretaries
of War and Navy. The new plan suggested a single cabinet
level secretary and a Department of National Defense, with
three subordinate service seer etar ies.67 xhe position of
Chief of Staff of the armed forces was eliminated. The Navy
could maintain a Marine Corps, but land-based reconaissance
'Navy Secretary Forrestal saw this new Secretary of
National Defense in a larger integrative role, with the




and ASW air assets were assigned to the Air Force. No action
was taken until after the 1946 Congressional Christmas recess
but, in January 19^7, after changes agreed to by both
Secretaries, (including identification of the Navy as primary
service for land-based ASW and maritime recona issance)
,
Congress saw the new presidential plan. It called for a
single Secretary of National Defense with Cabinet rank but no
separate department who would preside over the entire
"Military Establishment." The individual service secretaries
would still have direct access to the President and the
Bureau of the Budget, but would sit on the National Security
Council rather than the cabinet, and have roles and missions
addressed by Executive Order rather than by statute. [Ref.
55]
Congress used this structure for the National Military
Establishment in the National Security Act of 19^7 (Public
Law 253). The Secretary of Defense was tasked as the
president's principal advisor on national security, in
addition to his duties as head of the National Military
Establishment. A Central Intelligence Agency for the
collection and processing of intelligence related to national
security, and a National Security Resources Board, were also
created
.
The wartime Joint Chiefs of Staff were formalized and
tasked with serving as "the principal military advisors to
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the President, the National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense." [Ref. 56] They were to be assisted by
a Joint Staff under a Director, with Deputy Directors for
Strategic, Intelligence, and Logistics Plans.
While integrating the National Military Establishment,
Congress also created a National Security Council (NSC),
which was assigned the mission of advising the President,
"...with respect to the integration of domestic,
foreign, and military policies relating to the national
security so as to enable the military services and other
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate
more effectively in matters involving the national
security." [Ref. 57]
This Council was to focus on policy, not on plans or
organization. [Ref. 58]°° Statutory members included the
President, Vice President, Secretaries of State, National
Defense, and the three services, and the Chairman of the
National Security Resources Board. The President could
appoint other members as he saw fit.
The structure of the National Military Establishment and
the independence of the National Security Council lasted only
^^The roots of the NSC probably lay in the British
Committee of National Defense, nationalized through the
Standing Liaison Committee of the early 1940's and the State-
War-Navy Coordinating Committee of 1944. Although some
Congressional proponants of the creation of the NSC may have
supported it i-n hopes that it would constrain the President
(fearing a repeat of the recent experience of Roosevelt's
dominance in foreign affairs), it has strengthened his hand
by freeing him from dependence on his senior Cabinet advisors.
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two years before Congress felt it necessary to make important
modifications. In August 19^9 the National Security Council
was placed in the Executive Office of the President. The new
cabinet-level officer's title was changed to Secretary of
Defense, his powers were significantly enlarged, and the
individual service secretaries lost their cabinet status.
All elements of the National Military Establishment were
clearly subordinated to the new Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), and the service secretaries were deprived of
direct access to the President. The position of Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (non-voting) was created to provide
coordination for that body's deliberations. 69
Despite the National Security Council's creation by
act of Congress, it became apparent through the years that
^°(cont)It has affected foreign policy advice to the
President in three major ways: (1) by providing a forum of
senior officials who can review foreign policy issues for the
President; (2) by providing a focal point for the development
of foreign policy planning and decision processes; and (3) by
providing an umbrella for the emergence of a presidential
foreign policy staff. The founders mainly conceived of the
NSC in the first role, but it has become most importantly the
last. (I.M.Destler, "National Security Advice to U.S.









69 The position of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-
Chief was allowed to lapse when ADM Leahy retired in 1949.
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its use and effectiveness were very much a product of the
President and his administration. [Ref. 59] President, Truman
felt strongly about the advisory nature of the NSC. To
emphasize his autonomy, he seldom attended meetings,
preferring to receive the results of council deliberations in
the form of formal statements, although he occasionally
attended during times of crisis when immediate advice was
needed. With the onset of the Korean conflict the President
took a more personal interest in the NSC, limiting attendence
to a size appropriate to discussion, and creating a Senior
Staff and Staff Assistants to take responsibility for
projects previously assigned to _ad hoc committees. [Ref. 60]
While National Security Council operations depended on
the priorities and methods of the President, the Department
of Defense depended on the priorities of the President, but
the methods of the Secretary of Defense. The first Secretary
of National Defense was James Forrestal, formerly Navy
Seer e tar y.*^*^ Although he had been less than totally
satisfied with the way Congress chose to structure the new
National Military Establishment, he set about to do his best
to meet the difficult goals established for him by the
President.
70
'"^President Truman had first asked Secretary of War
Patterson to take the newly created position. Only when he
declined was Forrestal asked.
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The three services were accustomed to preparing their
annual budgets based on wartime needs and on the requirement
to justify costs only in terms of those needs. With the end
of the war and the usual demobilization, President Truman
provided Secretary Forrestal with a budget ceiling below
which the entire department was to stay. Unfortunately for
Secretary Forrestal the three services had not reconciled
themselves to unification, and when he asked the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to submit a compromise departmental budget he
received instead a combination of the separate budgets of the
three services which exceeded the budget ceiling by several
billion dollars. Although he did his best to meet the stated
priorities of his service chiefs, one of Secretary
Forrestal's first major official acts was to make policy by
his choice of budget cuts, something the Congressional
reformers had not intended, and which he did not desire. 71
7 1
'Forrestal had expected the service chiefs to advise him
on the division of funds within the limits set by the
President, and to share the responsibility for that division
with him. His own role he viewed as that of mediator between
the administration and the military services, bridging the
gap between what was needed and what was available. The
service chiefs, on the other hand, viewed their primary
responsibility as the protection of the interests of their
own branch, and felt that it was appropriate to "pass the
buck" upward on trans-service questions. (Lawrence J. Korb,
"The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:






Louis Johnson succeeded Forrestal as Secretary in early
1949. Secretary Johnson viewed his job as one of enforcing
economies on a reluctant military establishment. [Ref. 61]
The Chiefs were told to keep their combined budget within the
limit or have it arbitrarily cut by the Secretary with no
consideration of JCS priorities; to become "team men" or be
replaced. This confirmed another weakness reformers had
warned against — the politicization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff .72
Part of the JCS difficulty in developing a compromise
budget arose from the usual lack of guidance on strategy and
resulting priorities. Congress in a sense provided guidance
by its support of strategic bomber programs, but neither
Congress, the President, nor the NSC provided the Joint
Chiefs with policy guidelines upon which to base a rational
resource allocation plan. For the first time, U.S. military




'Although the service chiefs had access to Congress and
used it when they felt that the importance of a contentious
issue warranted, as military men they were torn between their
responsibility to ensure that the American public and their
representatives were aware of these issues and their
responsibility to support the Commander-in-Chief's programs.
In the case of Truman's chiefs, their decision to accede to
Secretary Johnson's demands without public question led to a
loss of status as military experts in the eyes of many
observers, and to a demand by Congressional Republicans that




The U.S. monopoly of the atomic bomb in the late 1940's
made possible a theory of almost total reliance on strategic
bombers for defense. The appeal of an "end to limited
warfare" brought about by the "umbrella" of nuclear defense
caught the imagination of Congress. "^3 when President Truman
chose cuts in strategic bomber programs as a method of
staying within his self-imposed defense budget ceiling,
Congress simply allocated the additional four billion dollars
requested by the air forces despite the. President's protests.
Attempts to moderate reliance on the nuclear umbrella in
favor of a more balanced approach to defense were seldom
successful. The Navy-Marine Corps campaign for the
maintenance of non-strategic forces met with little
approval. "^^ ADM Radford made a well-reasoned appeal for a
broader strategy during Congressional hearings on the B-36
bomber, (which had been prompted by accusations of improper
influence in procurement and program administration.)
"The kind of war we plan to fight must fit the kind of
peace we want. We cannot look to military victory alone,
with no thought to the staggering problems that would be
'•^This with a little help from those glamorous and
effective young generals of the Army Air Corps, later the Air
Force
.
'^Nayy policy-makers were not totally immune to the
attractions of the aura of atomic superiority. A large part
of their argument against over-dependence on a strategic
bomber force dealt not with concerns about the weakness of
the strategy but with a desire to maintain or even broaden
the Navy's role in the defense structure.
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generated by the death and destruction of an atom blitz
...[T]he United States is not sound in relying on the so-
called strategic bombing concept to its present extent...
In the minds of our citizens this fallacious concept
promises a short cut to victory. Our citizens must realize
thatits [sic] military leaders cannot make this promise."
[Ref. 62]
U.S. policy-maker's willingness to base their strategy
on the atomic monopoly received a serious blow with, first,
the explosion of an atomic device by the Soviets in 19^9 and,
next, the commencement of a "limited War" in Korea in
1950. ''^5 Defense priorities shifted from economy to
effectiveness in both conventional and strategic forces, and
the NSC finally provided defense planners with a clearly
articulated policy statement which to base plans and
priorities
.
On February 27, 1950 the NSC issued a paper, designated
NSC-64, calling for taking "all practicable measures" to
prevent further communist expansionism in Southeast Asia,
referring to Indochina as a "key" area and effectively
broadening the containment doctrine to include Asia.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt that there was need for
a more inclusive statement of U.S. policy and an even greater
'^George Kennan, while head of the State Department's
Policy Planning Staff, had warned that the policy of
containment chosen by Truman as the best way to deal with
expansionism would be far more likely to lead to a limited
local war than a major conflict.
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need to change the situation whereby Defense Department
strategic thinking was limited by budget ceilings. Over
several weeks in the spring of 1950 he and Paul Nitze, head
of the Policy Planning Staff, and a group of specialists from
the State Department, Defense Department, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff formulated an NSC paper which became the most
important and influential U.S. policy statement for a
decade ."^^
NSC-68, as the paper was des igna ted
,
called for a major
American rearmament and an increase in annual defense
expenditures from less than 14 billion dollars to as much as
50 billion dollars. It analyzed the world situation in terms
of a need for a greatly expanded military, diplomatic, and
economic effort to cope with a critical Soviet threat, which
it identified as being "antimated by a new fanatic faith,
antithetical to our own, and seek[ing] to impose its absolute
authority over the rest of the world." [Ref. 63]''''^ Secretary
Acheson, fearing dilution of impact, directed that the paper
'"Although NSC papers of the Truman years were composed
less of specific policy directives than of broad statements
of principle, they were an important source of guidance to
planners who were accustomed to having to deduce policy from
political statements and budget approvals. (Stanley Falk,
"The National Security Council Under Truman, Eisenhower, and





77 The nature and severity of this Soviet threat were
exaggerated for effect. Mr. Nitze, the prime architect of
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be promulgated without the usual inter-agency clearing
procedure, so it was essentially a State Department document.
(NSC-68 was drawn up before the outbreak of the Korean War,
but the war lent it great credibility.)
Critics have pointed out that NSC-68 was a ponderous
expression of elementary ideas, wherein Secretary Acheson and
the creators of the paper were interested more in polemic
value than in precise rationality. However ponderous or
elementary, NSC-68 served the purpose for which it was
designed. Military planners translated its recommendations
into force levels, and it provided a foundation for the
enormous force and budgetary expansion of late 1950 and
1951. 78
C. USING THE STRUCTURE - 1953-1960
Although President Truman was more willing to use the NSC
and the JCS in the policy-creation process after the
_
' ' (c6nt)NSC-68, realized that overstatement was necessary
to overcome the sense of complacency into which policy-makers
had fallen during the period of atomic monopoly. (John C.
Donovan, The Cold W arr iers
;
A Policy- M aking Elite
,
D. C.
Heath and Company, 1974)
''^°The State Department wanted to publish NSC-68, but the
Defense Department insisted that it remain secret because of
fears that its publication might constitute a committment
which could not be met, causing embarassment and loss of
credibility. Like the arguments over the military use of
atomic power, the arguments over basic priorities and
strategy were kept within the upper levels of government.
Strategy had not yet become a political question.
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commencement of hostilities in Korea, he viewed ' these bodies
strictly as sources of information and advice to his ultimate
policy-making role. With the assumption of office by
President Eisenhower in January of 1953 the role of the
NSC and, to a lesser extent the JCS, changed significantly.
Eisenhower's election in 1952 signaled the entry of the
military professional into politics, an interesting reversal
of the usual American tradition of politicians entering the
wartime military. This was notable proof of the enhanced
role of the military in American society as a result of World
War II. Any fears of increased militarization of a
government "in the hands of the professional military" were
unjustified; with a former professional soldier in the White
House the U.S. was to experience a considerable diminution of
the power of "purely military" factors in the control of
affairs. [Ref. 64]'^^
Although the new President's defense objective's were not
distinctly articulated, they were nevertheless identifiable:
(1) clear and unchallenged civilian responsibility in the
'^It was Eisenhower's very credibility as a military man
which allowed him to make cuts and modifications that might
otherwise have been refused. President Eisenhower's actions
and priorities provide an instructive case study in why most
"American military men" are more accurately identified with





Defense Establishment; (2) maximum effectiveness at minimum
cost; and (3) the best possible military plans. As part of
his election platform, he promised an increased role for the
NSC, which he felt President Truman was not using as Congress
had intended. A committee chaired by Nelson Rockefeller
presented its findings on defense reorganization to the new
president at the end of April, 1953» and Eisenhower used most
of its recommendations both to make changes and to justify
O A
changes he had already made.°^
As early as January 1953 President Eisenhower began to
change the NSC, introducing clear lines of responsibility and
authority and creating the position of Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs to coordinate NSC activity. He
created a permanent NSC staff and systematized staff
requirements, fixed a specific hour and day for meetings,
(which he usually attended, unlike his predecessor), and
added the requirement that each meeting begin with a current
intelligence briefing by the CIA director. [Ref. 65] In
A
°^One of the issues which the committee had been directed
to study was whether there should be separate and parallel
lines of command for civilian and military activities and
policy-making within DOD. The committee unanimously found
that it was impossible to make a sufficiently clear
distinction within DOD between military and civil affairs to
serve as a basis for divided responsibility. (Walter Millis,
Arms and the State, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958.)
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addition to statutory members, regular attendees included the
Treasury Secretary, Director of the Budget Bureau, and the
Special Assistant on Disarmament. The. former Senior Staff
was replaced by a Policy Planning Board directly under the
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. This body
was composed of Assistant Secretaries from the member
departments and agencies, and it was here that the real
policy work of the NSC was centered. Finally, an Operations
Coordination Board was made responsible for ensuring that
policies approved by the president were carried out.
In addition, the Rockefeller Committee recommendations to
transfer the functions of the Munitions Board and the
Research and Development Board to new Assistant Secretaries
of Defense were followed. Six new Assistant Secretaries were
added to the existing three, their position as staff rather
than line being emphasized. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were
excluded from the chain of command. The Secretary of Defense
would in future designate one of the military departments as
executive agency for a unitary theatre and that department
would designate its Chief of Staff as the theatre
commander. ° 'I The position of the Chairman of the JCS was
o
1
"'Although this was a change in form rather than





enhanced by making the selection and tenure of officers of
the Joint Staff subject to his approval, and transferring the
management of the Joint Staff to the Chairman alone. [Ref.
66]
Because President Eisenhower had a great deal of military
expertise, he needed a Secretary of Defense who was a manager
rather than a military advisor. [Ref. 671°^ Both Secretary
Wilson and his successor, Secretary McElroy, were interested
in managing rather than making defense policy, and they
expected the JCS to be part of the OSD staff. The president
apparently agreed with their philosophy, because one of his
first steps upon assuming office was to select a set of
service chiefs whom he felt would support his policies.
Despite Congressional criticism of this further
poli
t
icizat ion of the military advisement function, these
service chiefs were generally able to balance their
relationship as appointeees and advisors, and maintained
their credibility more than had their successors.
During the mid-1950's the NSC made increasing use of
outside consultants. In 1957 a committee of consultants,
originally convened at the president's direction to examine
op
"'^Eisenhower already had a strong source of foreign
policy advice in Secretary of State Dulles, and Dulles'
propensity for dominating policy input plus the increasing
influence of the Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs sometimes made independent contributions from a
military point of view rather difficult.
109

the implications of a proposed massive fallout shelter
program, used their report as a vehicle for the overall
review of American defense posture vis-a-yis the Soviets.
This Gaither Committee Report was strikingly similar to NSC-
68, and was accepted as a major cold war policy document. 83
On April 3, 1958 President Eisenhower announced plans for
a second significant reorganization of the defense structure,
based in part on the findings of the Gaither Committee. He
concluded that:
"Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone
forever. ..Strategic and tactical planning must be
completely unified, combat forces organized into unified
commands.. .singly led and prepared to fight as one,
regardless of service. The accomplishment of this result
is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised
and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating
under the supervision of the Commander in Chief." [Ref. 681
All combat forces were absorbed into the unified and
specified commands, and the service secretaries were removed
from the operational chain of command, which went from the
President through the Secretary of Defense to the unified and
specified commanders. The Joint Staff was greatly enlarged
and provided with an integrated operations division. Most
significantly, the Joint Chiefs were given the authority and
_°^The report's resemblance to NSC-68 is not surprising,
as one of the special consultants to the committee was Paul
Nitze. (John C. Donovan The Cold W arriers; a_ Pol icy- M aking
Elite, D.C. Heath and Company, 197^7
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*-fr'?i-
encouraged to delegate major portions of their service
responsibilities to their Vice Chiefs so they could
concentrate on JCS duties, and the Chairman, JCS became a




The 1958 changes to the defense establishment were the last
major official changes in form undergone by that entity.
While the form may not have changed, the functioning
continues to evolve. Every president since Eisenhower has
attempted to improve the effectiveness of his defense policy
making system according to his own chosen style. When the
1958 changes were made, however, there was no reason to
believe that they would not control the new weapons, new
tactics, and new strategies that were coming to the fore.
D. THE "NEW LOOK" AT STRATEGY
During the first half of 1957 many old military policies
and issues of civil-military relations were coalescing into
one large, vague, and elusive problem -- the "new warfare."
In January 195^, Secretary of State Dulles had announced that
the United States possessed a capacity for "massive
retaliation" against hostile action, and would not hesitate
to use it if the U.S. or any of its allies were attacked. At
the same time, agreements allowed allies some knowledge of
tactical nuclear weapons, and intensive study was begun of
the tactical and strategic employment of nuclear weapons.
Ill

The "great equation" of the best defense for the least
dollars, promised by Eisenhower in his election campaign,
took the form of more strategic and tactical nuclear weapons
and fewer conventional forces based on the "more bang for the
buck" thesis. [Ref. 70]^^
In 1956 and 1957 the "golden age" of American strategic
thinking began, with the publication of W.W. Kaufmann's
Military Policy and National Security and Henry Kissinger's
Nuclear W eapons and Foreign Pol icy . The basic assumptions
underlying the strategy of deterrence upon which American
nuclear strategy has always rested were: (1) realism, (as
defined by political historian Hans Morganthau); (2) moral
neutrality; (3) peace and security as desirable goals; (4)
the cold war as the essential model, and (5) rationality in
end/means analysis. [Ref. 71] From 19^5 to 19^9, while the
U.S. held a monopoly on atomic weapons, no significant works
on nuclear strategy appeared. From 19^9 to 1954, strategists
approved renewal of general purpose forces as a result of the
war in Korea, but no proponant of balanced forces could
overcome the sentiment that future Korea-type conflicts might
best be deterred by a strategic posture emphasizing nuclear
weapons
.
The cost per unit of energy output was figured to be




Changes in technology, such as the development of
credible ICBM forces by both the U.S. and the Soviets, and
the launching of the Sputnik spacecraft in August 1957,
brought about a revolution in strategic thought. Between the
Kaufmann and Kissinger books and Klaus Knorr's On the Uses of
^LLLllLl Z£^££ in lil£ iiid£i££Il A££ ^^ 1966, nuclear
strategists produced many works on most aspects of
contemporary strategy."^
All these emphasized the systemic nature of modern
strategy. Robert Osgood stated that:
"[I]n a nuclear age. ..to concentrate on planning wars is
little short of madness. Today there is no alternative to
peace.. .[ M ] ill tary strategy must now be understood as
nothing less than the overall plan for utilizing the
capacity for armed coercion -- in conjunction with the
economic, diplomatic, and psychological instruments of
power -- to support foreign policy most effectively by
overt, covert, and tacit means." [Ref. 72]
°^Ken Booth, in his article "The Evolution of Strategic
Thinking" (John Bayliss and others, Co n_t e m£0 r a r j/_
Strategy : Theories and Policies
,
Holmes and MeTer Publishers,
Inc., 1975) provides an excellent list of significant works on
strategy from the "golden age." He cites: A. Wohls tetter
Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases (a 1954 precursor);
W.W. Kaufmann (ed.). M il i tary Pol icy and National S e c u r i t y
H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy ( 1 957) ; ^
Osgood, Lim ited W ar : The Challenge to Am erican Strategy
(1957); A. Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror,"
Foreign Affairs (January 1959); B.Brodie, Strategy in the
M issile Age (1959); H.Kahn, On Ther m o-nuclear War (T96O)
;
T.C.Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (I960; H.Kissinger,
The Necessity for Choice (I960); H.Bull, The Control of the
Arms Race (196 1 ) ; G. Snyde r , Deterrence and Defense: Toward a
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One outcome of the strategic works of the mid-1950's was
a new respectability for the concept of limited war, which
the Army seized upon to justify its existence. A 1956 Army
study proposed a "National Military Program" among whose
elements were the deterrence of general war, the deterrence
of local aggression, the defeat of local agression, and
victory in general war. From this study and the works of
strategic thinkers of the period would evolve the concepts of
"flexible response," "balanced deterrence," and "measured
retaliation." [Ref. 733
E. NEW FRONTIERS - 1961-1963
In 1959 Senator Henry Jackson initiated a study of the
national security policy process. His Sub-committee on
National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on
Government Relations conducted an inquiry over the next three
years on how government processes helped or hampered prompt
and effective action in national security affairs. Although
the full committee report was not released until November
^^(cont) Theory of National Security (1961); T.C.Schelling
and M.Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (1961); K.Knorr and
T
.
R e a d
, Lim ited W ar in the Nuclear Age ("l 963) ;W.W.Kaufmann,
The M cNa m ara Strat egy "TT9 5 4 ) ; H . J .TTor genthau, "The Four
Far a d o x e s of Nuclear Strategy," Am erican Political Science
Revie w (March 1964); A.Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience
( 1 9 6 5 T; T.C.Schelling, Arms and Influence (19^611 P.Green,
Deadly Logic (196 6); K . PCno r r , On the Uses of M il itary Power
m the Nuclear Age ( 1966) .
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1961, the staff report on the National Security Council was
released on December 12, I960, and newly elected President
Kennedy used this report as an entering wedge for his
modifications to the NSC.
The new Special Assistant for Security Affairs, McGeorge
Bundy, was directed to consider specific recommendations that
included: (1) meetings should be scheduled only to advise the
president or to receive his decision on specific major items;
(2) reports should offer clear expressions of alternate
courses; (3) meeting attendance should be limited to
"principal actors" only; (4) the Policy Planning Board should
be replaced by a group used mainly to criticize and comment
on policy developed by the departments or stimulated by the
president; (5) the president should rely mainly on the
Secretary of State to synthesize foreign and defense policy;
(6) the Operations Coordinating Board should be abolished and
responsibility for policy implementation given to an action
officer; (7) the NSC staff should be reduced and more closely
integrated; (8) the statutory membership of the Chairman of
the Office of Civilian Defense Management should be dropped;
and (9) ways and means should be found to better integrate
NSC recommendations with budget decisions made outside the
Council. [Ref .• 74]
The implementation of recommended changes was made to
correct the major deficiency the Jackson Sub-committee found
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in the NSC, that it was paying too much attention to foreign
policy questions rather than adequately performing its role
of integrating and coordinating the military and political
aspects of the national security policy equation. More
importantly, it was to mold an NSC that would better suit the
new president's operating style. 86
In contrast to President Eisenhower's preference for
formalized structure and extensive staffing, President
Kennedy had a much more ad^ hoc and collegial style. he
believed that policy should be shaped primarily through day-
to-day decisions and actions, and thus tended to rely more on
his personal advisors rather than the cumbersome government
staffing procedures. During the Kennedy administration the
president's personal staff filled many of the advisory and
planning roles of the NSC and the State Department. Formal
°°The subcommittee's overall concluding statement,
delivered by Senator Jackson on November 15,1961, included
the following findings: (1)We need a clearer understanding of
where our vital national interests lie and what we must do to
promote them; (2)Radical additions to our existing policy
machinery are unnecessary and undesirable;(3)The key problem
of national security is not reorganization - it is getting
our best people into key foreign-policy and defense posts;(4)
There is serious over-staffing in the national security
departments and agencies ;( 5)The career services should be
made better training grounds for posts of national security
leadership; (6)We should reduce the needless barriers that
stand in the w-ay of private citizens called to national duty;
(7)Used properly, the National Security Council can be of
great value as an advisory body to the President ;( 8) No task
is more urgent than improving the effectiveness of the
Department of State;(9)We need a stronger, not a weaker,
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reorganizational lines were often ignored as the President
appointed inter-agency task forces to complete projects he
felt would benefit from a cross-fertilization of ideas. [Ref.
75]
The strategic philosophy of "flexible response" seemed to
the new president to be the appropriate solution to what he
felt was the most pressing need in foreign and defense
policy: attaining a greater degree of correspondance between
U.S. committments and capabilities. [Ref. 76] Containment
still remained the basic objective, but Kennedy's advisors
provided a more pessimistic assessment of the communist
threat and a more optimistic assessment of what the U.S.
could do to meet it. 87
Because he felt so strongly about the importance of
personal advice, and the relationship between the President
and his advisors, Kennedy wanted to appoint his own Joint
Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 77] The terms of the incumbent chiefs
had not expired, however, so he appointed Gen. Maxwell Taylor
°"(cont)Bureau of the Budget; and (10) The Congress
should put its own house in better order. (Henry M. Jackson,
The National Security Council : Jackson Subcommittee Papers on
^£jLi£Zz.!l^ii-'-"S £^ ^il£ ^£.££i££Ii^i£i L^^^i" fJ^ederick XT
7raeger, FubTTshers , 1965^
"'Part of -the motivation for the acceptance of flexible
response as a defense policy was Kennedy's strong concern
over the inability of the West to cope with insurgency
movements, which he saw as an increasing threat.
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his personal military advisor until the position of Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs was available. 88 Taylor had come to
Kennedy's attention as the result of his book The Uncertain
Tru m pet
,
which blamed the deficiencies of the American
defense system on the lack of a national basis for
determining military requirements.
After the Bay of Pigs incident, in which the president
felt his military advisors failed him, the JCS lost all
credibility in Kennedy's eyes. Even when he was able to
appoint his own men to the Joint Chiefs the uniformed
military was basically treated as a tool of the Secretary of
Defense, who became the primary source of "military"
advice. [Ref. 78]^^
President Kennedy appointed McGeorge Bundy his Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs. Bundy made several
chancges to the NSC to meet the president's preferences. The
Policy Planning Board and the Operations Coordinating Board
°°Kennedy did not want to "fire" the existing Chiefs, and
had he been willing to do so Congress would probably not have
accepted such action.
"^There is some irony in that when Kennedy began to
ignore his Joint Chiefs of Staff, that body was finally
becoming a true joint policy agency. The new generals and
admirals who were rising to senior posts were planners and
administrators as much as combat leaders, and most of them
had absorbed the values of the unified defense establishment
far more than had their predecessors.
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were abolished, and over the next few years the NSC role
changed from general policy formulation to a specific
advisory function. By the Cuban Missile Crisis, the
president was treating the NSC almost' as part of his personal
staff. Bundy also changed the NSC staff from an
administrative to a thinking staff. [Ref. 79]
President Kennedy felt very strongly that rationalizing
the government policy-making procedures was vital to the
country's well-being. This was particularly true in the case
of the Defense Department, with its huge budget devoted to
the essential but somewhat esoteric "national defense."
Before assuming the presidency, Kennedy appointed a
committee, chaired by former Air Force Secretary Stuart
Symington, to study the defense organization. The findings
of the committee contained two recommendations that served as
the keystones of Kennedy's defense policy: (1) the
administration must develop the military structure required
for a firm foreign policy without regard to budget ceilings;
and (2) these military forces must be operated at the lowest
possible price. [Ref. 80] Kennedy selected former Ford
president Robert McNamara as his Secretary of Defense to
effect these recommendations.
°"(cont)They were still uniformed military professionals,
however, and resented the fact that their advice was seldom
sought and often ignored.
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McNamara chose the Planning Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS) as his primary tool in rationalizing the
defense policy process. The system was installed by Charles
J. Hitch, an ex-RAND economist appointed Assistant Secretary
(Comptroller), and his deputy, Alain C. Enthoven.90 Cost
effectiveness based on systems analysis methods became the
backbone of the planning system.
PPBS provided an analysis that cut across service
boundaries, affecting the way they carried out their roles
and missions. Requirements and funding were categorized into
nine major mission and function areas, or programs; (1)
Strategic Retaliatory Forces; (2) Continental Defense Forces;
(3) General Purpose Forces; (4) Airlift and Sealift; (5)
Reserve and Guard; (6) Research and Development; (7) General
Support; (8) Retired Pay; and (9) Military Assistance. [Ref,
81]
A Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) serrved as a master plan
for the budget process. This plan, updated yearly, contained
programs approved by OSD with estimated costs projected for
the next five years. The budget process itself was extended
to eighteen months and divided into three distinct cycles.
During the planning cycle the JCS produced its threat
assessment, J-CS and unified commands produced force level
90 Enthoven later became an Assistant Secretary when his
Office of Systems Analysis was raised to that status.
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recommendations, and concurrently OSD produced a Major
Program Memorandum (MPM) for each of the mission areas. 91
During the programming cycle the secretary received the
planning documents, along with JCS comments on the OSD input
and OSD comments on the JCS input. The services also
submitted Program Change Requests (PCR) suggesting
modifications to the FYDP.92 During the budgeting cycle the
services prepared traditional category separate budgets.
These were reviewed by the Comptroller's Office and by the
secretary, who often made minute changes himself.
Secretary McNamara saw himself as an active manager
providing aggressive leadership to eliminate waste,
unneccesary duplication, and gold-plating. He expected the
JCS to incorporate economic criteria into their traditional
military requirements studies. The JCS were no more or less
important than any of his other advisors, and he expected
them to support his decisions.
91 The uniformed military inputs were usually ignored, and
the MPM became the primary planning document.
^^Of the average 300 PCR submitted annually by the
services to the Office of Systems Analysis, few were
approved. The three factors in disapprovals were: (1)poor
analytic techniques; (2)the requests did not convey a sense
of priority to the base program; and (3) cost. (Lawrence J.
Korb, "The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff: Conflict in the Budgetary Process, 1947-1971 ," Naval
War College Review, December 1971)
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Under McNamara, defense planning was dominated by civilian
defense intellectuals who had management, or analytic, rather
than strategic orientations. McNaraara's methods were
criticized largely because they ignored military advice and
influence, and because much of the analysis seemed designed
to support preconceived solutions or decisions already made.
For the first time, however, the Secretary actually had real
control of the Defense Department.
Claims that McNamara upset the civilian-military balance
are not necessarily accurate. Military advice was still
available, but decision-makers chose to make decisions based
on other criteria. The JCS had access to Congress, and
occasionally used it. The services learned basic logic on
why they had the requirements that they did, and they learned
to use systems analysis methods to present these
requirements. [Ref. 82]
F. DEFENSE POLICY UNDER A DOMESTIC PRESIDENT - 1963-1968
When Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963> the
United States inherited a president whose interest and
experience in foreign and defense policy were almost non-
existent. He was not comfortable in those realms, and he




As President Johnson's own style of operation evolved,
the impact of the White House Staff was reduced, while that
of the Cabinet officers was strengthened. The primacy of the
State Department in Foreign policy matters was reaffirmed,
and a degree of formality was restored to the NSC with the
creation of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, chaired by
the Under Secretary of State, and the Interdepartmental
Regional Groups. [Ref. 833
In 1962 President Kennedy had designated Secretary
McNamara his action officer on Vietnam, so President Johnson
initially left that problem in the secretary's hands.
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 288, produced by
the NSC in March 1964, was the first public document to
eliminate the ambiguity of U.S. policy on Vietnam, in stating
that "we seek an independent non-communist South
Vietnam..." [Ref. 84] U.S. "advisory" activity increased , and
by February 1965 the U.S. had commenced aerial attacks on
North Vietnam. In March the first non-advisory ground troops
reached Indochina.
Initially McNamara had treated the build-up in Vietnam as
a short-term prospect, instructing his staff to write budgets
based on the assumption that the war would be over by the end
of the Fiscal Year and deleting "non-urgent" programs from
the figures. This practice led to the necessity of
requesting budget supplements from Congress each year, which
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embarassed the President and hurt McNamara's credibility. By
the mid-1960's, these limitations had been raised.
Until late 1966 Secretary McNamara supported the
President's chosen method of "gradualism" in bombing, rather
than strong counter-force bombing, believing that it was more
suited to the philosophy of "flexible response," in which he
believed. 93 in October 1966, however, McNamara visited
Vietnam to view progress there, and what he saw convinced
him that the war was a losing proposition. He recommended
the stabilization of U.S. ground forces, and stressed the
need for greater dependence on South Vietnamese forces. His
open opposition to the President on one hand and the rise of
uniformed military influence, to which he had been opposed
for the past six years, undercut his value as a senior
advisor and policy maker. He was appointed President of the
World Bank in February 1968, and was replaced by Melvin Laird
as Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 851
Secretary Laird kept the basic defense planning system he
had inherited from McNamara, but his personal style and the
relative amount of credence he gave to civilian and uniformed
Q-3
^-•The President exercised extremely detailed control over
the bombing, including target selection, ordnance, and
execution. He let General Abrams run ground operations with
little interference, and the general chose a strategy of
attrition for his forces. Air strategy and ground strategy
were therefore at cross-purposes.
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military advice differed significantly from that of his
predecessor. Rather than viewing his role as one of
controlling the defense program, Laird saw himself as the
Pentagon spokesman within the administration, and as the
Department of Defense advocate to Congress and the public.
He viewed the Joint Chiefs as the primary military advisors
not only to himself but to the government as a whole, and he
encouraged them to air their differing opinions to Congress,
the Office of Management and Budget, etc. In return, he held
them more tightly to budget ceilings as finally approved by
himself and the president.
Because of his approach to planning. Secretary Laird's
requirement that the defense budget be more tightly
controlled was not unreasonable. He was willing to bargain,
negotiate, and compromise with the JCS in order to get a
concensus, and this in turn encouraged the Joint Chiefs to
work as a team, as there was not the intense pressure to
protect individual service interests in competition for
resources. By improving the status of the uniformed military
in the planning process, Secretary Laird helped to restore a
degree of balance to the outcome of the policy process. 94
94 President Johnson and many of the people he brought
with him into the administration were heavily oriented toward
domestic interests, and had a basic lack of understanding of
defense policy and mistrust of the uniformed military.
Secretary Laird could never fully break through this barrier,
but he tried to represent his military advisors in the best
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V. REDEFINING THE ROLE - 1968 and AFTER
A. REVERSING TRENDS - 1968-1976
When President Nixon took office in January 196 8, he
inherited a legacy of non-coherence in defense planning,
despite Secretary Laird's changes. President Johnson's
primary interest in domestic issues and his failure to ever
gain a firm understanding of the potential of the defense
policy planning system left the formal structure in
confusion
.
Neither the new president nor his selected Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, had
previous experience managing complex large-scale
organizations, and neither had experienced the potential
limits of personal grasp or the potential benefits of
delegation. Both men, however, had recognized competence in
the foreign affairs field, and this promoted confidence,
(among themselves and others), in their capacity. In 1969
the president pledged to restore the NSC to its pre-eminent
role in national security planning, and he set about
restructuring that body based on a goal of a personally
devised purposeful and coherent policy responsive to what he
saw as a watershed era in U.S. foreign policy. [Ref. 86]
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The keystone of President Nixon's foreign policy was the
"Nixon Doctrine" under which the U.S. would not relinquish
any of its global committments, but would put less effort
into meeting them directly, especially in Asia, using more
aid and less U.S. military presence, and leaving to allies
military activities uncongenial to the U.S. 95 He favored a
return to the concept of asymmetrical response, applying
strengths against weaknesses, and he began to assign military
policy to a place as one element of foreign policy rather
than as an independent system.
The new president made two general structural and
procedural changes with direct impact on the military
profession and military professionals in the planning
process: (1) internal adjustments within DOD restored greater
responsibility to military professionals in the budgeting
process, and (2) NSC machinery was restructured to allow for
a more formalized integration of political, military, and
other aspects of national security planning. These changes
were significant, but they were a matter of emphasis and
technique rather than substance. [Ref. 871
"^Frora 1969 to January 1974 the number of American forces
in Vietnam dropped from 550,000 to 24,000, and spending on
these forces dropped from 25 billion dollars annually to 3
billion dollars. Congress fully supported and even pushed
these moves. (Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony





President-elect Nixon had selected Henry Kissinger as his
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Although
General Andrew Goodpasture, as a member of Nixon's transition
team, was the original architect of the changes to the Nixon
defense planning system, Kissinger became involved in the
latter part of the transition period, bringing with him
former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Morton Halperin as an advisor. As an
academic, Kissinger had published works on the theme of the
overwhelming importance of purposes over techniques. He had
explored methods of achieving primacy for purposeful action
and creative thinking in an increasingly bur eaucr at ized
environment, and he felt it was important to avoid both the
excess formalism of the 1950's and the unstructured style of
Kennedy and Johnson. [Ref. 88]
It soon became obvious that foreign policy under
President Nixon would be White House and NSC-centered rather
than State Department-centered. NSC meetings were scheduled
frequently and regularly, and a specific agenda was followed.
The advisory nature of the council was emphasized; although
it provided a forum for discussion of issues by senior
policy-makers, all decisions were reserved to the President.
Attention was redirected to presidentially directed policy
reviews, (National Security Study Memorandum), to be drafted
by the numerous interagency committees, which were to present
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not agreed recommendations but real options for
consideration. For issues transcending the jurisdiction of
existing committees ,£d hoc groups were established. All
committee results were screened by the Kissinger-chaired
Review Committee, which decided whether they would be handled
by the formal council or would be sent to the State-chaired
Under Secretaries Committee,^"
Four significant new committees were established at the
Assistant or Under Secretary level; (1) Vietnam Special
Studies Group; (2) Defense Program Review Committee, (which
monitored DOD); (3) the Verification Panel; and (4) the
Washington Special Actions Group, (which dealt with short-
terra fast-moving situations.) With each new committee and
with the inevitable increase in staff, special assistant
Kissinger broadened his control over council activities,
chosing to personally chair most senior inter-departmental
committees and groups. He also tightened his control by use
of a personal style involving authoritarianism centralization
of power, and a degree of secretiveness . [Ref. 89]
For the first years, the Nixon NSC dealt primarily with
broad, long-range policy reviews, but over time the subject
^"This senior review group did not exist initially, and
until its inception there was some confusion as to the
function and hierarchy of the various committees. After
issue review began, however, priorities became obvious from
the actions of the Kissinger dominated group.
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of studies shifted to narrow operational questions reflecting
the somewhat narrow interests of Kissinger. The sheer number
of studies overwhelmed the available staff machinery, and
Kissinger's arbitrary methods further contributed to the
hectic atmosphere. By September 1973, when he was appointed
Secretary of State, retaining the special assistant position
as well, Kissinger had gained almost complete control of the
foreign policy formulation process by his control of
interdepartmental NSC committees and his jealously guarded
access to the president. He maintained his control by taking
many of the senior NSC staff personnel to the State
Department with him, and by selecting his successor as
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs upon his
replacement in November 1975.
Secretary Kissinger's term as Secretary of State extended
into the administration of President Ford. Brent Scowcroft
had been selected as Kissinger's successor as Special
Assistant for National Seccurity Affairs, but Ford allowed
Kissinger to dominate the foreign policy and, to a large
extent, the defense policy planning process from the State
Department. Although the NSC again convened regularly, (a
practice it had begun to neglect in later Kissinger years),
the complex network of committees was difficult to manage
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effectively without Kissinger's centralized control. ^'^ When
President Carter assumed office in January 1977 one of his
first priorities was to modify the foreign policy and defense
planning systems.
B. LEARNING FROM "FAILURE"
Although President Ford had attempted to maintain what he
perceived as the U.S. commitment to a negotiated settlement
in Vietnam, public sentiment and Congressional action had by
1975 decreed that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was over. 98 The
United States had attempted to resolve a political issue with
military force, ignoring the lessons of the French in
Indochina, and had ended up trying to solve a military
problem with political force. 99
^'Critics point out that it was difficult to manage with
Kissinger's centralized control, as attested to by frequent
cancellations of committee meetings and wasted staff work
caused by sudden shifts in priorities.
9°Part of the reason President Nixon had been willing to
allow continued North Vietnamese presence in the South as
part of the Paris accords was his determination to maintain
sufficient involvement of U.S. aid and troops to ensure
U.S.credibility as a negotiator. Congress' 197^ prohibition
of military involvement and 1975 aid cuts of fifty percent
destroyed any credibility the U.S. might have had. (Leslie H.
Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam : The System
Worked, The Brookings Institution, 1979D
99in On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
,
(Presidio Press , 19 8 31 , Harry G. Summers contends that the
senior uniformed military were partly at fault for the early
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Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts contend that while
U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam failed, the domestic decision-
making system worked, and that U.S. action in Vietnam was not
an aberration of the decision-making system but a logical
culmination of principles that leaders brought with them.
[Ref. 90]^^^ The vestiges of strategic bombing as the
ultimate tactic led to a situation wherein the air war became
an adaptation of ends to fit preferred means, and the failure
of military planners to understand and apply what to them
were non-traditional irregular warfare concepts further
contributed to the failure. [Ref. 91]
The JCS from the beginning had been passionate advocates
of a political option which would bring U.S. involvement in
the war to an end, [Ref. 92], but when it became obvious that
the political cost of such action was unacceptable to
poliitical leadership, they viewed escalation to a level
above the opponent's means as the only viable alternative to
99
( con t ) ( pr e- 1 9 65 ) military involvement in Vietnam
because of their failure to ensure that civilian policy-
makers understood the potential consequences despite their
reluctance to listen. The opposing argument is the
traditional one used by senior uniformed military; it is
inappropriate for the uniformed military to involve itself in
political questions, including when the use of military force
is appropriate.
^^Gelb and Betts list three general criteria by which the
U.S. system can be said to have worked: (1) the core
concensual goal of postwar foreign policy (containment of
communism) was pursued consistently; (2) differences of both
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to achieve a victory. 101 When President Nixon instituted his
program of Vietnamization, uniformed military planners were
in?
ready to fully support him.
The Vietnam war brought an end to the consensus on
containment, at least among theorists. In the 1970's a
"Second Wave" of works on strategy looked not in new
directions but at old questions revisited, revitalizing
strategic thinking with a dissatisfaction with the
assumptions of the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction)
100 (cont)elite and mass opinion were accompanied by
compromise, and policies never strayed very far from the
center of opinion both within and without the government; and
(3) virtually all views and recommendations were considered
and virtually all important decisions were made without
illusions about the odds for success. (Leslie H. Gelb with
Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam : The Syste m W orked
,
The Brookings Instftution, 1979. "5
101
^'Fear of traditional American anti-militarism was part
of the decision to first downplay involvement and later
downplay negative aspects of that involvement. Policy-makers
might have been wiser to have injected a degree of
emotionalism into the proceedings from the very beginning in
order to arouse the traditional American sense of mission.
102
^"^The myth of the overwhelming importance of strategic
bombing still persisted even at this late date and despite
earlier studies by JCS (Sigma II tests of September 1964)
indicating that most senior commanders doubted that it could
have crucial results. President Nixon took the risk of
bombing sensitive targets on the advice of his senior
military advisors, but he recognized both the political and
military risks, and he warned them, in effect, that "this had
better work." (Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, The





doctrine. 1 03 Advanced technology led to the continuing
improvement of a better "war-fighting" capability in the form
of strategic counterforce doctrine and improved conventional
capabilities, and the attitudes which had contributed to a
relative decline in American power since the early 1960's
were newly exam ined. 1 0^ New assumptions were formed,
centered around a view ruling out major war between the chief
military powers on rational grounds as politically pointless;
the strategy of war was replaced by the strategy of crisis
management.
C. NEW APPROACHES - 1977 and AFTER
President Carter was elected in November 1976, partly as
a result of an extended backlash against the "Watergate"
1 n -3
'^-'Colin Gray, himself part of this group, coined the
term "Second Wave" in reffering to such writers as Brennan,
Ikies, and Janowitz.
^O^In a study for the Director, Defense Nuclear Agency
entitled "Nuclear Strategy and National Style" (Rpt. No. DNA
581MF-1), Colin Gray lists seven attitudes contributing to
this decline: (1) the belief that a nuclear war could not be
won; (2) the belief by defense intellectuals that other
cultures shared, or would come to share, American values and
strategic ideas; (3) optimism that Soviet thought and
behavior could evolve in a constructive direction; (4) the
belief that the American military establishment posed as
great a threat to traditional American values as Soviet
ambitions (which had probably been m isassessed) ; (5) a
widespread belief in the superiority of American technology
and strategic ideas; (6) substitution of an endeavor to
manage the strategic balance in place of defense plans geared
to a unique foreign policy response; and (7) a tendency to




image of his Republican opponant. He was determined to
change the image of the national policy-making process, and
to show that he would not repeat his predecessor's mistakes,
and selected Zbigniew Brzezinski as his Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs. Brzezinski shared Kissinger's
academic background, but his management style differed
significantly. He cut the NSC staff in half, and established
a simple and flexible system involving primarily two
committees, the Policy Review Committee and the Special
Coordinating Committee. Chairmanship of the Policy Review
Committee rotated according to subject rather than being
controlled by the special assistant.
The Carter administration never developed a clear sense
of priorities. [Ref. 931 Instead, it tried to do everything
at once, which created serious difficulties in setting
priorities. President Carter preferred to receive his
foreign policy and defense policy advice from his Secretaries
of State and Defense, his national security advisor, and top
aides in an informal but regularly scheduled luncheon
meeting. His search for a balance between humanism and
pragmatism made him somewhat skeptical of the objectivity of
military advice. After the Iranian hostage crisis of late
1979 he began -to lose some of his idealism, but the voting
public had been unconvinced of the viability of "born again"
defense policy for some time, and in November 1980 Ronald
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Reagan was elected on the platform which included a promise




A. THE AMERICAN STYLE
The operational style through which the American
military planning system developed, has two primary
components; (1) institutional factors, important in the
development of the military establishment; and (2) personal
factors, important in the development of the "American
character." Both components were integral from the inception
of the American military planning system, with surprisingly
little change in the almost even balance between the two.
Liberalism's conflict with and impact on military values
was the most important institutional factor. [Ref.9^] The
liberal philosophy, popular at the creation of the American
nation, saw peace as the natural state of man. Since power
struggles were an aberation of nature, there was no need for
a standing army. In the rare conflict the citizen would rise
to meet the threat, then happily return to his natural state
of peace. [Ref. 95] Leaders in peace would be the best
leaders in war, for they lacked any untoward ambitions for
power or tendencies toward militarism. The idea of a
separate standing military was anathema; like any other




action to sustain itself, and such action would be wrong.
[Ref .96]
The United States was born by breaking away from the
European power balance system, and this combined with the
liberal ideal of peace as a natural state to convince early
policy-makers of the wisdom of avoiding alliances. [Ref. 971
For over a century the American cultural system and
government evolved in isolation from the developed world,
attaining a strong sense of personal and institutional
e
t
hnocen tr ism . ^ ^° This isolation, the abundance of
resources, and the entrepreneurial willingness to exploit
them, gave the U.S. the luxury to experiment with a peaceful
society. The absence of immediate external threat precluded
a need for the expenditure of resources and effort on
national defense and, with the exception of the Civil War
years, Americans spent little on defense until the 20th
Century
.
Despite the Founding Fathers' intellectual inheritance of
liberalism, as businessmen and lawyers they were also the
1 O'S
"^The practicality of staying out of European quarrels
was probably the most important of the considerations
involved .
^Despite the diverse ancestry of the early Americans,
this isolation also helped to create a surprisingly
homogeneous culture. By the end of the 18th Century the
common man of European ancestry living in the United States
was already an identifiable American.
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heirs of a sense of realism which recognized a basic conflict
between the democratic ideas of their countrymen and the
practical requirements of formal government. George Mason
admitted, "Notwithstanding the oppression and injustice
experienced among us from democracy, the genius of the people
is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be
consulted." [Ref. 98] They therefore suffered the dilemma of
having little faith in the people but insisting that
government be based on them. Jeremy Belknap said, "Let it
stand as a principle that government originates from the
people; but let the people be taught ... that they are not
able to govern themselves." [Ref. 99]
This juxtaposition of the values of the common man with
the need for pragmatic leadership led to a seemingly
dichotomous style of idealistic rhetoric and realistic action
which over the two centuries of the nations' existence,
became so ingrained that most Americans do not recognize its
irony. [Ref . 100] ''^'^
The final institutional factor having a major impact on
the development of the U.S. military planning system is the
structure of the government pertaining to the selection of
107
'See Hans Morgenthau for a thorough discussion of
realism and idealism in U.S. foreign policy, and of how the
loss of the early statesmen's sense of balance between the
two has affected U.S. actions.
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policy-makers. American policy-makers at the highest level
are elected to relatively short terms of office, (four years
being standard), and a major criterion for their selection is
accountibility to the electorate. Democratic governments are
intrinsically maladapted to long-range planning for this
reason. The frequent calling to account forces policy-makers
to place a high premium on near-term results, and the
popularity of a decision often is more important than its
rationality. [Ref. 101] Another result of the policy-makers'
short terms is a lack of continuity in both policies and
priorities. ^*-'^ The existence of a strong infrastructure of
professional bureaucrates blunts the impact of this problem
in the civilian hierarchy, but the frequent turnover of
middle and senior level decision-makers within the uniformed
services tends to exacerbate it.
Personal factors important in the development of the
American character consisted partly of personality traits,
which actually conflicted with military structural values,
and partly of traits which made it difficult to develop a
sense of professionalism or a planning philosophy. The
1 n ft
'^°Since World War II one of the first actions of a new
President has usually been to change significantly the
priorities an'd sometimes the structure of the planning
system, largely in an effort to distance himself from his
predecessor's policies. The impact of a new Congressman is
much more diluted, but potentially significant.
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agressive individualism of most young Americans, [Ref. 102]
was not conducive to military discipline, (although it
produced a soldier with initative unheard of in most armies),
and the culture provided more encouragement to individualism
than it did to discipline. The American credo of democracy
and of "majority rule" as the source of authority, [Ref. 1031,
was also difficult to reconcile with the traditional
hierarchical structure and leadership structure of the
military. 109
Because the American had seldom been called upon to
contribute directly to his own defense, "I ""^ he was reluctant
to forgo his pursuit of personal and commercial happiness for
the questionable rewards of military service, an unpleasant
but necessary obligation in wartime only.
Only when the American's "crusader spirit" and sense of
mission were aroused by some righteous cause was he eager to
become involved in the military, and that only for the
usually short time it took to resolve the issue or for his
09;^ttemptsto "democratize" the military structure
resulted in the disastrous militia system of the nation's
first century.
'^The bulk of the King's troops in America prior to the
independence were British regulars and mercenaries, not local
recruits, and after independence geographic isolation and
British seapower protected him. Even during the revolution
only about three percent of the population was under arms.






enthusiasm to wear thin. [Ref.104] Because he saw everything
in terms of "good" and "evil," he always fought on the side
of good, (good by American standards), and if the cause was
not cloaked in these terms he was unwilling to become
111involved .' ' '
B. IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN STYLE ON THE U.S. MILITARY
PLANNING SYSTEM
The American military establishment grew from this unique
experiment in government and nationhood, and evolved with the
American historical experience. Six elements of the American
style had direct impact on the development of the military
planning system.
Two elements can be traced to the style's liberal
heritage. First, liberalism's anti-military orientation
ensured the exclusion of the uniformed military from the
mainstream of government decision-making, (until World War
II), with the result that many policies having important
consequences for the military establishment were formed in
the absence of uniformed military input. [Ref. 112] The
existence of separate planning system was considered not only
unnecessary but provocative.
Next, civilian policy-makers, primarily in Congress, were
in absolute control of military policy, ostensibly because of
111 This character trait was the first and most
significant factor in the American public's loss of support
for action in Vietnam.
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the doctrine of civilian control of the m i 1 i t ar y . 1 1 2
Congressional involvement was not limited to broad policy
issues. As late as the Civil War congressional committees
and individual congressmen interested themselves in the
routine details of military operations. [Ref. 105] This
involvement lessened after the Civil War, but the involvement
of executive branch civilian policy-makers increased
sporadically, reaching a high point during the term of
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. [Ref. 106]
A third element is that the American style's democratic
heritage contributed to unclear and often divergent goals,
resulting from the lack of continuity and the popular
accountability of operation in a democratic system. Fourth,
uniformed military planners received little guidance as to
national priorities, and therefore were unable to complete
even the most routine plans with any assurance that they met
requirements. [Ref. 107] Until World War I, most strategic
military planning was done by ancillary bodies such as the
War Colleges, and was kept discreet for political reasons.
11?
'''^The concept of civilian control of the military as
established in the constitution had by the 1840's been
adapted to the "spoils system," providing another source of
political appointments, (the Military and Naval Academies and
senior militia posts), and sponsorship for Congressmen.
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The fifth element having an impact was the fact that as a
result of the low priority accorded military policy during
peacetime, significant attention was paid to the military
planning system only during wartime, and significant changes
were made to the system only as a result of wartime necessity
and apparent weaknesses. Planning systems operated beyond
obsolescence instead of evolving with technology and foreign
policy, and Americans always entered a conglict "fighting the
last war."''''3Every wartime generation had to relearn the
lessons of history. [Ref.108]
The final factor in the American style on the military
planning system was a belief in the absolute separation of
"military" issues from "political" issues. Politics was
outside the uniformed planner and policy-maker's realm;
civilian policy-makers resolved political issues or directed
the military how to resolve them, but the military
professional was not to express an independent judgement on
the issues. 114
1 1 -3
-•Fortunately American adaptability under pressure is very
great, and by the end of each conflict the system had been
brought up to date, only to languish unchanged until the next
great conflict.
114 The early military leaders who interested themselves in
political issues were politicians in uniform, not
professional military men. From the 1840's to the beginning
of the Civil War, and after that war, the professional
military brotherhood largely eschewed politics, foreign and
domestic. (Leonard Wood and Billy Mitchell were notable
exceptions.) When President Kennedy encouraged his senior
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C. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PLANNING SYSTEM
It is arguably inaccurate to refer to a U.S. military
planning system before 1898. The luxury of non-involvement
made possible by geographic isolation and the tacit
protection of British seapower made long-term planning
unnecessary in the eyes of congressmen controlling the
military. The War Department and, in 1798, the separate Navy
Department, were administrative bodies, not planning bodies.
After the War of 1812, the military departments were upgraded
with the creation of the War Department general staff in 1813
and the Board of Naval Commissioners in 1815, but these were
simply modernized administrative bodies. [Ref.109]
In 1821 the position of Commanding General of the Army
provided senior civilian policy-makers with a source of
operational advice, (as did the short-lived position of
Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1861 to 1869), but
emphasis was on battlefield operations rather than long-range
planning. [Ref.110]
The Naval War College (1884) was the precursor of a
military planning system, and its very existence was
^ '^(cont)railitary advisors to provide military insight on
what they considered political questions, they essentially
abdicated their advisory responsibilities to DOD civilians,




frequently questioned in the first decade. [Ref.111] The
experiment of the Naval Policy Board (1890) lasted only a
short time,but the success in the Spanish- American War of
war plans created by these two seminal bodies finally lent
military planning a degree of respectibility
.
One reason for the lack of urgency in the development of
a planning system before 1898 was the dearth of opportunity
to study the consequences of poor military planning.^ ^5 jhe
increased frequency and intensity of military involvement in
peacetime affairs, including the occupation of lands taken
from Spain, and involvement in Latin American and Cribbean
matters
,
forced the development of some sort of planning
apparatus
.
The wartime Naval War Board was succeeded by the General
Board (1900), which dealt with both planning and operations;
in 1899 the administrative position of Chief of Staff of the
lie
-'The early years of the Civil War provided numerous
opportunities to study these consequences, but the special
traumas of internal conflict were blamed for most of them.
By the end of the war the system's deficiencies had
supposedly been "corrected," and that premise was not tested
for another thirty-three years, when the failure of the army
logistics system in Cuban action proved it false.
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Army replaced the operational Commanding General ; "1 "I ^and in
1903 the Army General Staff was created specifically to deal
with questions of strategy and planning. With the 1909
creation of the Navy functional "aide" system, both services
had modern administrative systems; and with the 1903 creation
of the Army War College, both had fairly complete planning
117
systems . ' ' '
Still lacking was a sense of long-range strategic
military planning, and a structure designed to deal with it.
The War Colleges did some work in this area, but they were
moving from strategic studies toward a more tactical
orientation, and the Army General Staff was increasingly
mired in the day-to-day details of administration.
Homage was paid to the increased complexity of warfare by
the creation of the Joint Board of the Army and Navy in 1903.
[Ref. 112] This body was commissioned to produce joint
strategic war plans, which it did for a few years.
Unfortunately a new awareness of the need for long-range
strategic military planning and joint doctrine conflicted
with the political reality of isolationism and neutralism,
and efforts tied to these concerns had to be hidden from
] 1 f. This partly as the result of an on-going power
struggle between the Commanding General and the Secretary of
War. The Secretary won.
117




public (and the President's), view until 1916 when the
urgency of preparing for involvement in the European quarrels
1 1
o
allowed a renewal of strategic planning. °
Although the United States returned to isolationism after
World War I, military planners kept a rudimentary modern
planning system alive, despite the resurgence of the standard
policy of peacetime neglect of military matters. The
airpower controversy made civilian policy-makers aware of
evolving strategic considerations, and saved the strategic
aspect of the military planning system from oblivion.
The new experience of operating with allies during World
War I was taken seriously by military planners, and long
before civilian policy-makers admitted the complexity of
world political and economic interdependence, strategic
military planners were thinking in terms of multi-national
military involvement for the U.S. This was the first major
attempt to view the U.S. as part of a greater world system,
and as such was the harbinger of American strategic thought.
-110
''°The range of "strategic" planning in 1916 was much




World War II marked the beginning of a revolution in the
American military and foreign policy style, with consequent
changes to the military planning system. "Il^ As the only major
power to survive the war with its economic system and
industrial base intact, the United States became the
"champion" of Free-World forces in the battle against
communism. These vastly enlarged world commitments forced
the retention (after 194?) of a much larger than usual
peacetime military establishment, and made necessary the
expansion and professional i zat ion of the military planning
system.
Strategic thinking and planning during the war years was
largely ad_ hoc and reactive. The combination of President
Roosevelt's personal style and dominance of the decision-
making process, the need for flexibility and freedom of
action by the military in operational matters, and the
isolation of the public and sometimes Congress from the
management offorces in the field, allowed senior military
planners to conduct the war without fear of immediate
''^World War II was a significant watershed not only in
military affairs, but also in political, economic, and social
affairs. The last vestiges of the old European power system
gave way to a bi-polar system ostensibly based on ideology,
the world economic system increased in complexity, and modern
communications spread the "revolution of rising expectations"
to all parts of the world.
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accountability. Concentration centered on winning the war;
there was neither time nor energy to devote to long-term
strategic issues, which had always been the province of the
civilian policy-maker . ^^^
The military had a system capable of dealing with the
routine administrative details of modern force since the
early 20th Century. With the National Security Act of 19^7,
a structure for unified planning was created, (and
strengthened in 19^9, 1953, and 1958.)''21 xhe new structure
dealt not only with the administration and operation of a
unified National Military Establishment but also made
provisions for a formalized system of integrated strategic
planning
.
With the end World War II came the traditional
dissolution of the wartime force structure in anticipation of
a return to normalcy. By early 1947, President Truman's
decision to commit American money, and armed forces if
necessary, to contain the spread of communism made it clear
that the definition of normalcy had changed drastically.
IPO
"^^The structure was created in 1947, but unified
planning did not function with any degree of success until
MacNamara's time at DOD, and after he left it went into
remission again.
1 ? 1"^
'There were exceptions to this short-term orientation,
most notably Gen. Marshall's concern for post-war operations
and JCS' similar interests.
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[Ref.113] In July 194? George Kennan articulated the idea of
"containment," which was to serve as the basis for U.S.
strategic and military thought for the next fourteen years.
[Ref.114]
While President Truman was basing his rhetoric on the
doctrine of containment, he was also struggling to control
the size of the budget. His chosen method was to base the
size of the military's share of the budget on how much was
left after all other programs had been funded. Thus his
foreign and domestic priorities were at cross-purposes, a
situation dramatically clarified by the necessity for
Congress to over-ride his objections and provide funding for
the Korean action outside the normal budget.
President Eisenhower had no real argument with the
doctrine of containment. His Secretary of State, John Foster
Dulles, who dominated foreign policy, changed containment
from a doctrine to an ideology, and introduced the idea of a
"zero-sum" world in which, when any nation went communist,
American security was lessened. [Ref.115] The importance of
credible U.S. forces and the need for economy at home were
resolved by a greatly increased reliance on nuclear weapons,
which were less expensive for force gained than were
conventional forces.
By the late 1950's, strategists questioned the viability
and wisdom of over-reliance on nuclear weapons as a source of
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security. [Ref. 116] The frightening potential consequences
of nuclear conflict brought into question the desirability of
their use under any circumstances, but especially where the
application of lesser force could accomplish the goal.
Reality lagged behind theory, however, the launching of
Sputnik in 1957 provided a final impetus to the missile race,
and started a technological spiral that was to have a
dramatic impact on American military planning.
In 1961, Senator Henry Jackson's Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery completed a two year study of the defense
policy-making structure. Among the committee's findings was
the need for a clearer understanding of where vital U.S.
national interests lay and what should be done to promote
them. President Kennedy chose systems analysis, with its
power to rationalize defense operations and "scientifically"
analyze threat, as the best method to meet these needs.
Systems analysis provided a new way of looking at
military issues. [Ref. 117] Any non-quantifiable element was
disqualified from consideration, and non-rational factors
such as intuition and experience were irrelevant. As
strategic thought moved from consideration of mutual assured
destruction to flexible response, the uniformed military
input to the military planning system shrank. The capa-




The failure of systems analysis and the rationalist
ideology in Vietnam contributed to a profound mistrust of
these methods and ideas. As early as 1967 strategists were
warning against total reliance on quantitative measures,
[Ref.128], and in 1970 Stefan T. Possony and J.E.Pournell e
published The Strategy of Technology : W inning the Decisive
War , a seminal work on what continues today to be the primary
approach to military thought and planning: strategic
analysis.
Strategic analysis provides a strategy for fighting a
technological war, with strategy driving technology rather
than the reverse. [Ref.129] It integrates the four major
elements of technology, government support, nonmilitary
conflict, (psychological operations, economics, etc.), and
the military arts, providing a synthesis of the traditional
planning process and technological considerations.
In the seventies and early eighties such analysts as
E.S.Quade ( Analysis for Public Decisions ) and strategists as
Richard K. Betts ( Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises )
,
Sam Sarkesian, ( Beyond the Battlefield: the New M ilitary
Zll£££££l.£Il£i.i£I!l ^ ' ^"^ Colin Gray ( S t_ r £_t e_ g _i £ ^^ii^i.££^ '
continued in the same vein to explore methods to integrate
military strategy and planning which can be applied to attain
U.S. goals. It is too early to say whether strategic
analysis will be any more successful than its predecessors,
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but since it combines the best elements of previous planning
styles, it shows promise.
Writing shortly after World War II, Max Lerner observed
the necessity of having "soldiers on the [American]
landscape." To a great extent one of the major political
chapters in the American story has been occuring since World
War II. How can an essentially democratic nation, committed
to individual freedom, maintain itself between an external
authoritarian threat and the pull of the Garrison State? It
has been demonstrated how hesitant the United States was to
accept a powerful Secretary of Defense, how universal
military training was rejected, and in recent years the
debate over the general staff. The history of the American
culture would clearly suggest that military planning in the
United States must reflect the basic cultural context: the
intellectual currents combining behaviorism and quantitative
methods with experience are only part of the American
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